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SITUATING “GROUPS” IN CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT:  
INTERROGATING JUDICIAL ARGUMENTS ON ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS, GENDER EQUALITY, AND GAY EQUALITY 
Stuart Chinn∗ 
The New Deal transformation in Commerce Clause and Due Process jurisprudence marked, 
among other things, a shift in judicial attention from groups defined by economic relationships to 
groups defined by social status.  Hence, one might plausibly see judicial activism in defense of 
freedom of contract during the Lochner-era subsequently giving way, in part, to the judicial 
protection of racial minorities, women, and gay persons in the decades after Brown v. Board of 
Education. 
In this Article, I attempt to illuminate this shift in judicial attention by examining the Supreme 
Court’s rhetoric surrounding groups in the context of the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours 
regulations and the post-Brown v. Board of Education-era cases on gender and gay equality.  I 
situate my inquiry in the context of broader themes in American political thought, with particular 
attention to the core concepts and principles of American liberalism.  In examining the recurrent 
modes of argument surrounding groups in these Supreme Court cases, I discuss how the Court’s 
concept of groups—and how its views of American society more broadly—has varied in different 
constitutional doctrinal contexts. 
My examination of these cases yields two key findings.  The first finding speaks to a similarity 
across these contexts of Supreme Court jurisprudence:  when confronted by reforms calling for 
special or different legal treatment of specific groups, both pro-reform and anti-reform Supreme 
Court Justices in these three doctrinal contexts put forth arguments about group-sameness and 
group-difference.  That is, group-sameness and group-difference arguments were deployed by 
Justices on both sides of the various legal controversies in these doctrinal areas.  The second 
finding speaks to a difference between these doctrinal contexts:  while arguments in defense of 
special legal treatment for groups in the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours regulations were 
linked to larger, broader, more systemic goals, no such sensibility informs the judicial protection of 
groups in the post-Brown cases on gender and gay equality.  Rather, in more recent years, the 
judicial defense of groups largely proceeds from a judicial concern for only the groups in question.  
Thus, we see in the more contemporary cases examples of judicial arguments about “societal 
segmentation”—a significant mode of legal and political argument that, I assert, has appeared 
episodically throughout American history.  In the final Part, I set forth a more general definition of 
societal segmentation arguments, and I discuss how notions of segmentation may be situated in 
relation to the principles of American liberalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The New Deal era is commonly recognized as a crucial breakpoint 
in American constitutional development for, among other things, 
marking a transformative shift in the Supreme Court’s Commerce 
Clause and Due Process jurisprudence.1  As many have noted, the 
Supreme Court’s lessening concern with protecting economic rights 
in cases such as West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,2 United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.,3 and United States v. Darby4 ultimately gave way, in part, to 
judicial protection of the individual rights of racial minorities, wom-
en, and more recently gay persons.  This marked shift in focus by the 
judiciary from focusing on individuals and groups defined by eco-
nomic relationships to focusing on individuals and groups defined by 
social status was encouraged in the notable Footnote Four of the Car-
olene Products ruling.5  In an opinion otherwise devoted to the theme 
of judicial deference toward legislation on economic matters, Justice 
Harlan Stone hinted in Footnote Four’s memorable third paragraph 
that heightened judicial scrutiny may be appropriate for laws that 
targeted “religious,” “national,” or “racial” minorities, or for laws that 
encompassed “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”6 
My primary goal in this Article is to further examine the substance 
of this doctrinal shift suggested in the third paragraph of Footnote 
 
 1 See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 256–57 (1998); PAUL 
BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 516, 549–50 (5th ed. 
2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 640–41 (4th 
ed. 2011); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 117–20 (revised by San-
ford Levinson, 2d ed. 1994); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 811–
17, 1352 (3d ed. 2000); 12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN 
CONSTITUTION:  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1941–1953, at 32–38 (Stanley N. 
Katz ed., 2006). 
 2 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 3 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 4 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 5 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 (1980); 
see also BREST, supra note 1, at 517–18 (suggesting that Footnote Four’s protection of the 
rights of “discrete and insular” minorities offered “a new justification for judicial review of 
legislation”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 712–13 (explaining the relationship between 
Footnote Four and “heightened scrutiny for government actions discriminating against 
racial and national origin minorities”); WIECEK, supra note 1, at 141–42 (citing concern 
over the civil rights of minority populations as one reason for the Court’s rejection of 
“classical legal thought” during this time period).  On the rise of a new judicial concern 
with protecting groups defined by racial, religious, and ethnic identity in the post-New 
Deal era, see David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights:  
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 743, 761–79 (1981). 
 6 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
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Four.  In discussing this shift in judicial attention from groups de-
fined by economic relationships to groups defined by social status, I 
intend to offer a preliminary exploration of a significant element in 
American political and legal thought that is present in one context 
but absent in the other.  I argue that the Court’s discussion of groups 
and societal differentiation in its Lochner-era cases on economic rights 
and its more recent cases on gender and gay equality reflect recog-
nizably distinct judicial perspectives.  In the former body of doctrine, 
the Court linked the differential treatment of certain groups to larger 
public or society-wide interests.  In the more recent cases on gender 
and gay equality, however, such arguments are much more subdued.  
Indeed, in the gender and gay equality cases, the differential treat-
ment of certain groups is mainly justified with reference to the 
unique hardships and interests of those specific groups.  This contrast 
between more universalistic, public-regarding justifications versus 
more group-specific justifications speaks, I believe, to a notion of soci-
etal segmentation that is present in the more recent cases.  Segmenta-
tion arguments are a significant mode of argument that, I will sug-
gest, have appeared episodically in different policy arenas and 
different times in American political and legal thought. 
In Part I, I set the context for my inquiry in discussing the scholar-
ly literature surrounding American political “traditions.”  This litera-
ture begins with the subject of liberalism, the political philosophy 
that nearly all scholars consider dominant in American politics.  But 
alongside liberalism, I discuss its various competitor traditions, in ad-
dition to some of the more recent scholarship on liberalism that em-
phasizes its malleability and interconnectedness with other, some-
times conflicting, political ideological themes. 
In discussing this scholarly literature, I also introduce two key 
conceptual dichotomies that are implicated in the notion of societal 
segmentation.  These concepts are generally used in both descriptive 
and normative ways, and have constituted elements of every major 
tradition in American politics.  The first dichotomy is the notion of 
individualism versus the notion of emphasizing groups in thinking 
about the constitutive units of American society.  The second dichot-
omy speaks to competing notions of how American society is, or 
should be, organized:  an emphasis on sameness and relative equality 
among members of the political community in terms of legal, politi-
cal, and social status versus an emphasis on entrenched differentia-
tion and differential treatment for various individuals and groups in 
the political community. 
In Part I, I very briefly discuss how each of the major American 
political traditions has intersected with these conceptual dichotomies.  
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I also set the stage for the discussion in Parts II and III, where I begin 
to interrogate the relative importance of individuals/groups and 
sameness/differentiation in two constitutional doctrinal areas:  the 
Supreme Court’s Lochner-era cases on economic rights (discussed in 
Part II) and its more recent cases on gender and gay equality (dis-
cussed in Part III).  The judicial rhetoric in these various cases will 
not directly clarify the relative importance of the individuals/groups 
and sameness/differentiation conceptual dichotomies at these differ-
ent moments in constitutional history.  Still, by examining patterns in 
how the Court has discussed groups across these cases—and by seeing 
how the Court has deployed arguments about group difference and 
group sameness in the contexts of economic rights, gender rights, 
and gay rights—hints of the greater influence of the segmentation 
ideal in the more contemporary cases will become clear. 
Thus, beginning in Parts II and III, but continuing in a more ex-
tended discussion in Part IV, I flesh out the two primary claims of this 
Article:  first, the Court’s more recent cases on gender and gay equal-
ity reflect a greater judicial acceptance—relative to the Lochner-era 
Court—of approaching certain legal issues with a presumption of 
greater segmentation in American society.7  In fleshing out this claim, 
I tentatively offer a more general theory of segmentation as a mode 
of political and legal argument, and discuss its broader applicability 
to other contexts. 
My second primary claim concerns the status of liberalism.  As dis-
cussed in Part I, an acceptance of fixed, unchanging groups sits in 
tension with the emphasis on individualism at the heart of liberal po-
litical philosophy.  To the extent judicial rhetoric can be taken as fair-
ly representative of broader trends in American political thought, at 
least among political elites, the greater judicial willingness to recog-
nize segmented groups in its opinions reflects the greater comfort 
within contemporary American political thought of moving to the 
outer edges of liberalism.  Thus, I conclude the Article by discussing, 
in Part IV, an oddity about contemporary rights jurisprudence:  the 
Court is deeply committed to deploying a non-liberal concept, such 
as the social group, to achieve liberal ends including achieving great-
 
 7 My examination of groups in judicial rhetoric in this paper is limited to two kinds of 
groups:  groups constituted by professional identity or employment in the Lochner era, 
and groups constituted by social identity and social status in the post-Brown era.  While 
the doctrine surrounding these groups has played an out-sized role in American constitu-
tional development, this does not exhaust the entire range of important groups in Amer-
ican politics and society, of course.  Corporations, for example, are also commonly rec-
ognized as a kind of social group as well.  LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS:  
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 2 (1987). 
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er freedom and emancipation for certain disadvantaged individuals.  
This intertwining of illiberal and liberal concepts in turn suggests, I 
believe, a continuing development that will ultimately lead to a great-
er acceptance of social groups and group difference within American 
liberalism, and a continued adaptation of liberal ideology. 
Finally, let me offer a quick comment on case selection:  since the 
context for my inquiry is limited to only three significant doctrinal 
areas, I should mention some reasons for my choice to focus on these 
particular areas.  The Lochner8-era cases on economic rights and the 
post-Brown9 cases on gender and gay equality are appropriate for 
analysis, and for comparison to each other, for two simple reasons.  
First, each context saw legal reforms at stake that aimed to improve 
the rights and entitlements of groups perceived by many to be rela-
tively disadvantaged under the status quo.  To invoke some terminol-
ogy that will be introduced in Part I, one might plausibly say that both 
doctrinal areas involved beneficial or benign class legislation.  Se-
cond, each context stands out as a conspicuous and significant period 
of judicial assertiveness regarding group or class interests.  The first 
period saw the Court responding negatively, and conspicuously, to 
legislative enactments aiming to regulate economic relationships for 
certain kinds of employees and their employers.  The latter period 
saw the Court elaborating in a similarly conspicuous manner upon 
the rights of women and gay persons that went beyond prior doctrine 
and established federal and state statutes. 
There are a number of other avenues—whether judicial or non-
judicial—where these themes might be explored.  Indeed, I might 
note one prominent omission in the case discussion below:  I have lit-
tle discussion of the Court’s jurisprudence on race in the years prior 
to and during the Jim Crow era.10  These cases constitute some of the 
strongest historical support for the existence of an “ascriptive-
hierarchical”11 political tradition, or a commitment to social group 
 
 8 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 9 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10 For instances of judicial antipathy, sometimes explicit and sometimes more implicit, to 
African-American rights, see, for example, Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Williams 
v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); The Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
581 (1872).  For a general discussion of a heightened conservatism from the Court in the 
post-Reconstruction era, see STUART CHINN, RECALIBRATING REFORM:  THE LIMITS OF 
POLITICAL CHANGE, 65–108, 193–236 (2014). 
 11 See infra 37 and accompanying text. 
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inequality.  As such, these cases exhibit a judicial assumption of en-
trenched, social group differentiation in American society.  Further-
more, beyond the omission of certain cases, the judiciary itself cer-
tainly holds no monopoly on discussions of the concepts and ideals I 
am investigating; an examination of legislative and executive actions 
would also be relevant to an inquiry regarding how groups are dis-
cussed and treated in American law and politics. 
Notwithstanding the above, however, I limit my discussion in Parts 
II and III to the Lochner-era economic rights cases and the gender 
and gay equality cases.  My focus on Supreme Court doctrine stems 
from the fact that the Court has a particular institutional orientation 
toward justifying and elaborating upon its actions in its opinions that 
is sometimes absent in the actions of the elected branches.  Because 
the concepts surrounding group rights and social segmentation speak 
to foundational and abstract themes in American political thought, 
they seem particularly likely to intersect with constitutional doctrine 
in significant ways. 
Further, in focusing on judicial cases dealing with class legislation 
benefitting disadvantaged groups, we might also observe some dis-
tinctive arguments justifying or critiquing the targeted treatment of 
certain groups that are distinct from arguments in those contexts 
where racial and gender hierarchies are being promoted—the latter of 
which have been ably explored by others.12  Finally, my targeted focus 
on only the aforementioned doctrinal areas stems from the presump-
tion that instances of judicial assertiveness will tend to force underly-
ing ideological commitments and presumptions more to the surface.  
When the judiciary orients itself in opposition to existing statutory 
law or case law in highly visible political controversies, this political 
context will tend to make the Court more inclined to offer elaborate 
and substantive justifications for its decisions.  That is, contexts of ju-
dicial assertiveness seem particularly likely to encourage the Court to 
be more self-conscious and explicit about its ideological presump-
tions, and about its role in relation to the elected branches.13  In con-
 
 12 See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:  CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY (1997); see also infra Part I. 
 13 Thus, even among the Court’s Lochner-era cases on economic rights and its post-Brown 
cases on noneconomic rights, I have focused on those cases where the Court explicitly 
spoke to the individual/group and equality/differentiation concepts under discussion.  
Other cases from these eras touch upon these themes in less explicit ways, of course, but 
my choice of cases proceeds from the assumption that greater value—at least at this stage 
of the inquiry—lies in tracing the interaction between certain ideological concepts and 
the judiciary’s understanding of its institutional role in those opinions that deal with the-
se issues more explicitly. 
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trast, I suspect that instances of the judiciary affirming or reconciling 
itself to prior legislative action—as was the case with some of the key 
Jim Crow-era cases14—will tend to provide judicial actors with a 
broader range of politically plausible judicial responses.  Majority 
opinions in such cases may be narrow or broad in scope, deeply rea-
soned or shallowly reasoned.15  Thus, focusing on cases where the 
Court’s political capital might be at greatest risk seems an appropri-
ate starting point for examining key aspects of American political 
thought, and how certain ideas intersect with the judiciary’s under-
standing of its role in American democracy. 
I.  INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS AND EQUALITY/DIFFERENTIATION IN 
AMERICA’S POLITICAL TRADITIONS 
In discussing the Footnote Four shift, others have examined the 
Court’s change in focus from economic to noneconomic rights in 
doctrinal or normative-legal theoretical terms.16  As noted above, we 
might gain a different sense of the Footnote’s significance by focus-
ing on some of the more abstract concepts implicated in the constitu-
tional treatment of groups.  But necessarily prior to that exercise, 
some clarification and discussion is warranted regarding the concepts 
themselves that will structure the subsequent case analysis.  The par-
ticular focus below will be on two key conceptual dichotomies.  The 
first is the ideal of individualism set against an emphasis on groups.  
The second dichotomy is the ideal and legal promotion of relative 
equality and sameness among members of the polity, set against the 
opposing ideal and legal promotion of entrenched differentiations 
within the polity.  I will flesh out both conceptual dichotomies in the 
 
 14 The Court did strike down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in the Civil Rights Cases, though 
that was a statute that had enjoyed very little political support.  CHINN, supra note 10, at 
77. 
 15 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
10–14 (1999) (explaining these different modes of adjudication). 
 16 ELY, supra note 5, at 75–77, 151–53; see also BREST, supra note 1, at 517–18 (explaining that 
after the Court moved away from judicial review of economic legislation, “protecting de-
mocracy” and “protecting civil rights” were new justifications for reviewing other types of 
legislation); WIECEK, supra note 1, at 136–42 (noting that Footnote Four “set the agenda 
for the Court” during this period and highlighted the concern of some Justices that legis-
latures could not “be counted on to protect discrete and insular minorities”); Terrance 
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1164 (1977) (“More re-
cently, concern has been directed toward threats to . . . noneconomic rights.”); David A. 
Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1253–1254 (2010) (de-
scribing the Court’s shift away from the Lochner-era decisions, which focused on economic 
rights). 
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context of the major “traditions” in American political thought.17  
That exercise, in turn, will help provide content to the notion of so-
cietal segmentation, the latter of which I will emphasize in the subse-
quent parts of this Article as a key element of the Footnote Four shift. 
A.  Liberalism 
Liberal political philosophy is generally understood to be at the 
center of American political thought; hence, most scholarly discus-
sions of American political ideologies or traditions begin with an ex-
amination of it.  By “liberalism,” most commentators on American 
politics have a John Locke-inspired version of liberalism18 in mind, 
emphasizing some mix of the following key commitments and ideals:  
individualism, individual rights, a limited state, “atomistic” social 
freedom (i.e., negative liberty), and commitments to property rights 
and market capitalism.19  Furthermore, most also emphasize a notion 
of equality or universalism lying at the core of liberalism, with respect 
to individual rights and entitlements.20  This also leads to an accom-
panying emphasis on government by consent and representative gov-
ernment; so long as individual rights are respected, the basic equality 
among members of a liberal political community leads to some form 
of majority rule.21  At the same time, of course, conceptions of liberal-
 
 17 I use the term political “tradition” in the manner defined by Rogers Smith:  “(1) a world 
view or ideology that defines basic political and economic institutions, the persons eligi-
ble to participate in them, and the roles or rights to which they are entitled, and (2) insti-
tutions and practices embodying and reproducing such precepts.”  SMITH, supra note 12, 
at 507 n.5. 
 18 For a brief summary discussion of John Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government within 
the context of a broader discussion of American liberalism, see JAMES P. YOUNG, 
RECONSIDERING AMERICAN LIBERALISM:  THE TROUBLED ODYSSEY OF THE LIBERAL IDEA 23–
39 (1996). 
 19 The key text in this literature is LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA:  AN 
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 12–18, 55–
60, 62–64, 128–34 (1955).  Other key works include:  J. DAVID GREENSTONE, THE LINCOLN 
PERSUASION:  REMAKING AMERICAN LIBERALISM 48 (1993); CAROL A. HORTON, RACE AND 
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 5 (2005); SMITH, supra note 12, at 8, 18, 35–39, 507 
n.4; ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (2d ed., 
1985); YOUNG, supra note 18, at 6–7, 327–29.  The Lockean liberalism discussed here 
should be distinguished from “legal liberalism,” the latter of which Laura Kalman de-
scribes as a faith in the potential of the judiciary—the Supreme Court in particular—to 
bring about progressive change on behalf of more disempowered social groups.  LAURA 
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2, 247 n.1 (1996). 
 20 HARTZ, supra note 19, at 56, 205–06; DESMOND KING, IN THE NAME OF LIBERALISM:  
ILLIBERAL SOCIAL POLICY IN THE USA AND BRITAIN 7–8 (1999); SMITH, LIBERALISM, supra 
note 19, at 18, 35–37; YOUNG, supra note 18, at 6, 328. 
 21 GREENSTONE, supra note 19, at 48; HARTZ, supra note 19, at 56–62; HORTON, supra note 
19, at 5; SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS, supra note 12, at 507 n.5. 
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ism also emphasize a sense of cautiousness and wariness about major-
ity rule—hence the aforementioned focus on individual rights (espe-
cially property rights) and commitments to constitutionalism and the 
rule of law.22 
Undoubtedly different scholars would emphasize some concepts 
and deemphasize others among those I mention.  Still, there are 
clear convergences in the scholarly literature, and much of that con-
vergence reflects a point of intellectual history:  the preceding discus-
sion, and the authors cited within it, rely upon, critique, or are oth-
erwise in conversation with the work of Louis Hartz.  Hartz’s key 
claim was that a pervasive liberal political tradition exists in America 
due to the absence of feudalism in our history and historical con-
sciousness.23  The Hartzian thesis, as noted in more detail below, has 
been subject to sustained scholarly critique.  Yet, despite its potential 
shortcomings, the Hartzian thesis retains enough significance to re-
main a starting point for many discussions of American political 
thought. 
For our purposes, we might extract from the preceding discussion 
two key concepts implicated in most conceptions of American liberal-
ism that bear directly on the constitutional doctrinal shifts that are 
our focus.  The first, which is emphasized by all scholars of American 
liberalism, is relatively uncontroversial:  liberalism’s emphasis on in-
dividuals as opposed to groups or classes.  It is the individual that re-
mains the unit of analysis within liberalism—the entity entitled to 
rights, and the key constitutive unit of civil society and the legal-
political system.  Indeed, liberalism’s emphasis on individualism was, 
in Hartz’s estimation, crucial in explaining the absence of more eco-
nomic class-based politics in American history; the myth of Horatio 
Alger-like upward economic mobility, so his argument went, proved 
too attractive an aspiration for American’s working class.  That is, less 
wealthy individuals preferred to channel their energies in pursuit of 
the individualistic, Alger myth over class-based political mobilization 
and collective action.24 
 
 22 See YOUNG, supra note 18, at 6, 328. 
 23 HARTZ, supra note 18, at 3–14, 20.  On this point, Hartz drew on a Tocquevillian insight:  
“The Americans have this great advantage, that they attained democracy without the suf-
ferings of a democratic revolution and that they were born equal instead of becoming 
so.”  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 480 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Law-
rence trans., 1966); see also YOUNG, supra note 18, at 100 (noting that Hartz drew upon 
the influence of de Tocqueville as the “starting point for his theory of liberal consensus”). 
 24 HARTZ, supra note 19, at 6, 111–13, 199–200, 203–11.  The theme of individualism has 
also been at the core of non-American versions of liberalism as well.  See, e.g., MICHAEL 
FREEDEN, IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL THEORY:  A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 144–45, 153, 
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A second and perhaps more contestable liberal concept worth 
emphasizing is the notion of equality.  As previously noted, precisely 
what makes American society liberal, according to Hartz, is the ab-
sence of permanent feudal classes.  Thus, while individuals in a liber-
al society would want and expect differences to emerge among them-
selves with respect to wealth and property, there would also be an 
expectation of equal rights and equal legal entitlements for all full 
members of the political community.  There may also be an emphasis 
on the relative equality of social status for all members of the political 
community as well; notwithstanding substantial economic differences 
that may exist among them, citizens in a liberal polity would not view 
those differences as fundamental or permanently entrenched.25  This 
pervasive equality across individuals marked a point of concern for 
Hartz, and at an earlier time, Alexis de Tocqueville as well.  Both 
warned of the specter of a tyranny of the majority, where such equali-
ty might lead to a problem of conformity and the stifling of dissent.26  
One might say then that both theorists noted ambivalence, or even a 
hostility in American political thought—at least at a conceptual lev-
el—toward entrenched, permanent differentiation in society. 
B.  Civic Republicanism 
While liberalism remains central to discussions of American polit-
ical traditions, civic republicanism has often been invoked as a com-
petitor of sorts to it.  Trying to define the contours of civic republi-
canism would be nearly as difficult as the analogous chore for 
liberalism, but at least with respect to the two items emphasized 
above—individualism and equality—one might roughly sketch out an 
alternative perspective. 
In contrast to liberalism’s focus on the individual and individual 
social freedom, many have emphasized the civic republican focus on 
the normative ideal of an active citizenry, oriented toward serving a 
larger common good or the general welfare of the polity.  Thus, the 
civic republican vision places relatively greater emphasis on the duties 
 
185–86 (1996).  Notably, Freeden has also discussed an emphasis on community within 
non-American versions of liberalism that soften the latter’s focus on the individual; he 
thus argues that considerations of societal or the common good can be incorporated 
within liberal ideology.  Id. at 203–06, 249–50, 254–58.  That said, even these less individ-
ualistic forms of liberalism seem to remain some distance from whole-hearted acceptance 
of social group differentiation and societal segmentation—the latter of which clearly 
seems to reside at the outer edges of or outside American liberalism. 
 25 See supra note 20. 
 26 HARTZ, supra note 19, at 11, 57, 254–56; TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 254–56. 
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of citizenship and on the polity as an entity worthy of consideration 
in its own right.  This is a theme that J.G.A. Pocock traced from Re-
naissance political thought to the American context;27 that Gordon 
Wood emphasized as an enduring theme in the American Revolu-
tionary era;28 and that contemporary political theorists like Michael 
Sandel invoked as a normative prescription for the ills of current pol-
itics.29 
Second, with respect to liberalism’s commitment to equality and 
social undifferentiation, some scholars have emphasized a civic re-
publican view that diverges in key respects.  A sense of equality 
among citizens also underlies many discussions of civic republican-
ism;30 but, equality in the latter is sometimes accompanied by the 
theme of a persistent divide, and the potential for conflict between 
“the people” and “elites.”31  Hence there is a basic and fundamental 
 
 27 See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:  FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 506–07, 550–52 (1975). 
 28 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 58 (3d 
prtg. 1987) (describing the common good in the American colonial context as follows:  
“This common interest was not, as we might today think of it, simply the sum or consen-
sus of the particular interests that made up the community.  It was rather an entity in it-
self, prior to and distinct from the various private interests of groups and individuals . . . .  
[P]olitics was conceived to be not the reconciling but the transcending of the different 
interests of the society in the search for the single common good . . . .”); see also id. at 53–
65 (discussing republicanism’s focus on the public good, and the ways in which this in-
formed Americans’ conception of how their society should operate during the Revolu-
tion). 
 29 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT:  AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 3–7 (2d prtg. 1996) (contrasting contemporary liberalism, which the author 
argues is ill-equipped to address the sense of disempowerment afflicting public life, with 
republican political theory, which “may offer a corrective to our impoverished civic life,” 
in light of its emphasis on civic considerations).  On republicanism in general, see Daniel 
T. Rodgers, Republicanism:  The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 18–20 (1992); see also 
SMITH, supra note 12, at 15, 507 n.5 (treating republican traditions as “grounded on pop-
ular sovereignty exercised via institutitions not just of formal consent but of mass self-
governance”). 
 30 See SMITH, supra note 12, at 37 (explaining that democratic republicanism can have 
strongly egalitarian implications); WOOD, supra note 28, at 70–75 (discussing how the 
Americans’ adoption of republicanism led to a fundamental change in their social struc-
ture, as the principle of equality became central to the governing of society). 
 31 Wood discusses this theme among key anti-federalist figures during the Founding Era, 
who he views as legitimate spokesmen for the republican tradition.  See WOOD, supra note 
28, at 513–24, 562–64 (discussing the anti-federalists’ pervasive distrust in what they con-
sidered to be an essentially aristocratic government established under the Constitution, 
and the ways in which their rejection of this new system compelled Federalists to articu-
late how and why it was “strictly republican”); see also POCOCK, supra note 27, at 507; 
WOOD, supra 28, at 57–58 (discussing how republicanism ushered a new era of coopera-
tion between rulers and citizens); John P. McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy:  Control-
ling Elites with Ferocious Populism, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 297 (2001) (arguing that Nic-
colò Machiavelli theorized for extensive institutional and cultural means of popular 
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societal division that accompanies some strains of civic republican 
thought that is in tension with core components of liberal ideology. 
Among those interested in exploring the historical role of civic 
republican thought in American history, few claim that its influence 
has been nearly as significant as liberalism.  Daniel Rodgers notes 
that among scholars of the revolutionary and early national eras, few 
“doubted that liberalism ultimately swept up the nation’s economic, 
political, and cultural life.  The project [of these scholars] was to stay 
the hand of the Hartzian moment, not to deny it.”32  Still, certain el-
ements of civic republican thought undoubtedly live on in our politi-
cal vocabulary, and one might find connections between its themes 
and other bodies of American thought such as populism.33 
C.  Ascriptive Hierarchies and Multiple Traditions 
While much of American politics can be explained with reference 
to either a liberal or civic republican political tradition, much else 
remains that seems to fall outside these two bodies of thought.  
Hence one of the strongest critiques pressed against the Hartzian 
thesis stems from an emphasis on the politics of exclusion in Ameri-
can history.  A long and very extensive history of law and politics cen-
tered on discriminatory and exclusionary state actions against racial 
minorities, women, and gay persons in particular raises serious ques-
tions about Hartz’s claims.  How pervasive could the liberal commit-
ment to individuals, individual rights, and universal equality be if 
such stark social segmentation and group-based oppression has 
played a major role in our history?  Focusing on doctrinal develop-
ments in citizenship law, Rogers Smith asserts that such group-based 
 
control over political elites).  This basic idea was a notable component of Jacksonian po-
litical thought.  See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 1815–1848, at 380–81, 501, 582 (2007) (describing the 
Jacksonian emphasis on popular rule set in opposition to the pernicious influence of spe-
cial interests and elites); WHITCOVER, PARTY OF THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE 
DEMOCRATS 138–39 (2003); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  
JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 513–14 (1st ed. 2005) (explaining that the Jacksonian democratic 
emphasis on popular rule opposed the pernicious influence of special interests and 
elites).  This idea also appeared within Populism as well.  See MICHAEL KAZIN, THE 
POPULIST PERSUASION:  AN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1995) (“That is the most basic and tell-
ing definition of populism:  a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a 
noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving 
and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.”). 
 32 Rodgers, supra note 29, at 24.  Rodgers does note, however, that scholars who studied re-
publicanism in labor history tended to see its influence extending further across Ameri-
can history.  Id. at 30. 
 33 On the rhetoric of populism, see generally KAZIN, supra note 31. 
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exclusion and inequalities are so pervasive that they encompass noth-
ing less than a tradition in American political thought separate from 
liberalism and civic republicanism.34  He labels it a tradition of “as-
criptive hierarchies.”35  Indeed, it is the presence of “multiple tradi-
tions” in the American political imagination and vocabulary that, ac-
cording to Smith, allows for change and innovation in American 
political thought.36  As politicians cobble together various strands of 
thought from each of these traditions into coherent narratives of citi-
zenship—in order to bring together majority voting coalitions—new 
combinations of ideals and commitments can be created.37  Thus, the 
multiple traditions approach explains the presence of more exclu-
sionary modes of thought in our history, and allows for interpreta-
tions of American political thought encompassing change and inno-
vation, which might seemingly be precluded by the implication of 
persistent continuity within the Hartzian thesis of a rather hegemonic 
American liberal tradition. 
D.  Innovation and Flexibility in Liberalism 
Thus, a crucial fault line might be drawn between a liberal per-
spective and the ascriptive-hierarchical perspective with respect to the 
two core concepts I have emphasized.  While the liberal perspective 
emphasizes individuals and the ideals of relative equality and same-
ness, the ascriptive-hierarchical perspective emphasizes clearly-
defined groups or classes of persons, and allows for differential (and 
subordinating) treatment of those groups or classes. 
Subsequent to Hartz, however, other theorists of American liberal-
ism have set forth more nuanced conceptions of liberalism that chal-
lenge such a clear distinction between it and the more exclusionary 
aspects of American politics.  These post-Hartzians have emphasized 
the flexibility of liberal ideals and liberal language, with at least two 
significant addendums to the Hartzian perspective. 
The first addendum is a challenge to Hartz’s view of liberalism as 
a static, relatively unchanging philosophy.  To the contrary, scholars 
such as J. David Greenstone and Stephen Skowronek have empha-
sized how the complexity of concepts within American liberalism al-
lows creative political entrepreneurs to reshape those concepts.  The 
consequence of such conceptual reshaping and transformation, they 
 
 34 SMITH, supra note 10, at 6, 8–9, 30–39. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. 
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argue, allows for the possibility of real conflict and real development 
within liberal political thought.  Greenstone, for example, discussed a 
“bipolarity” in American liberalism between a “reform” variant of lib-
eralism “concerned primarily with the development of the faculties of 
individuals,” and a “humanist” variant of liberalism “concerned pri-
marily with the satisfaction of the preferences of individuals.”38  These 
two variants allowed for points of disagreements to occur even among 
individuals all committed to liberalism, and for innovation to occur 
within liberalism as well—the latter of which Greenstone explores in 
the case of Lincoln.39 
In a similar vein, Skowronek has focused on the example of Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson and traced how President Wilson took conven-
tionally understood liberal concepts such as “nationalism” and “de-
mocracy” and innovatively used them to promote racist political 
goals.40  Skowronek refers to such acts as the reassociation of ideas 
with different programmatic purposes, and he views this as more than 
just instrumental, strategic action by clever political entrepreneurs.41  
The case of President Wilson demonstrates, he argues, that such acts 
of conceptual innovation are capable of helping to constitute new el-
ements of the American political tradition.42 
The second addendum to Hartz, oriented more directly as a re-
sponse to the multiple traditions thesis, is to challenge the characteri-
zation of liberalism and ascriptive-hierarchical ideology as encom-
passing separate traditions.  Contrary to Smith’s multiple traditions 
approach, some post-Hartzian theorists acknowledge the possibility of 
inegalitarian and ascriptive-hierarchical ideals existing within liberal 
ideology.43  How then might illiberal political outcomes—such as ex-
clusionary laws aimed at racial minorities and women—coexist or 
even be facilitated by liberal ideals and commitments?  These post-
Hartzians emphasize at least two possible mechanisms.  First, scholars 
have emphasized that liberal ideals and language have often been 
deployed in ways consistent with, or supportive of, inegalitarian 
 
 38 GREENSTONE, supra note 19, at 6. 
 39 Id. at 6–7, 33, 48–50, 236–43. 
 40 Stephen Skowronek, The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes:  Racism, Liberalism, and the 
American Political Tradition, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (2006). 
 41 Id. at 392. 
 42 Id. at 385, 385–86, 388–89, 393–95, 398–400. 
 43 See, e.g., KING, supra note 20; Ira Katznelson, Books in Review, 27 POL. THEORY 565, 568–70 
(1999) (reviewing ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:  CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN 
U.S. HISTORY (1997)). 
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goals.44  For example, a liberal polity might generate illiberal out-
comes through exclusionary standards regulating membership into 
the political community.  Those who are deemed “full” members 
might enjoy a full array of liberal rights protections and enjoy the ex-
pectation of full equality.  Those who fall short of full membership 
for whatever reason, however, might be deemed less “fit” for such a 
status, and excluded from these benefits in a manner consistent with 
liberal ideals.45 
Second, a liberal polity might generate illiberal outcomes through 
one of the core institutions of liberal ideology:  representative-
democratic government.  One then might lay at least partial respon-
sibility for the appearance of illiberal, exclusionary statutes in Ameri-
can history upon liberalism, since such statutes were created via liber-
al institutions.46  Hence the consequences of liberal ideals can 
sometimes be seen as consistent with illiberal political outcomes. 
The flexibility and complexity of liberalism emphasized above has 
led some post-Hartzians to offer a view of the liberal political tradi-
tion that is more amorphous than what Hartz imagined.  Rather than 
viewing it as a discrete set of ideals and commitments, some scholars 
view it as more akin to a grammar.47  Stears summarizes this view as 
follows: 
[T]he American liberal tradition is in essence a prolonged argument 
about a series of shared but indeterminate ideals.  The bare outline of 
 
 44 See, e.g., HORTON, supra note 19, at 4–5, 37, 96 (explaining that the liberal position 
“blended easily with a newly expansive and more severely hierarchical conception of 
race”); KING, supra note 20, at 10–23 (describing possible justifications for illiberal social 
policies within a liberal framework); Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (“Even when con-
ceptualized as neutral rules of the game, liberalism’s ordinary functioning can, under 
some circumstances, advance and thus bond with nonliberal and illiberal impulses of var-
ious kinds.”). 
 45 See KING, supra note 20, at 11–13 (discussing the emphasis that liberal democracy and its 
theorists place on assessing who should be excuded from or included in the polity); 
Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (“Doctrinally, key liberal thinkers elaborated standards 
for inclusion in a liberal polity based either on levels of rationality . . . or on compounds 
of rationality and ascription . . . .”). 
 46 See Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (asserting that key liberal institutional inventions 
such as political representation and political consent by the governed have led to the ex-
pression of majority’s exclusivist and racist preferences). 
 47 See, e.g., HORTON, supra note 19, at 5 (arguing that treating liberalism as a flexible dis-
course is consistent with long accepted theories of cultural practice); Gary Gerstle, The 
Protean Character of American Liberalism, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1043, 1045–46 (1994) (noting 
the “malleability” of the liberal tradition); Marc Stears, The Liberal Tradition and the Politics 
of Exclusion, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 97 (2007) (noting that “liberalism is essentially a 
loose set of interrelated general ideas” and that “[t]he American liberal tradition . . . is 
essentially a shared argument rather than a set of clear, coherent, and consistent be-
liefs”). 
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these ideals—including liberty, equality, and a worry about excessive 
power—is consistent over time, and it plays a vital role in shaping the po-
litical identity of the nation and ensuring a remarkable continuity of 
popular aspiration over time.  But the precise meaning and concrete po-
litical implications of such concepts as liberty, equality, and power have 
been the subject of continuous contestation.48 
Yet, as powerful as these post-Hartzian arguments may be, a point 
worth emphasizing—and one that all of them seemingly concede ex-
plicitly or implicitly49—is that even a flexible liberalism cannot be all-
encompassing.  To see all events in American politics as inescapably 
leading back to liberalism risks either ignoring or minimizing certain 
events (the critique that prompted the multiple traditions thesis it-
self) or expanding the meaning of liberalism to the point where it 
fails to hold much analytical value. 
My own inquiry begins with a slightly different point of departure 
relative to some of the post-Hartzians; my emphasis is less on the in-
herent suppleness and complexity of liberalism and more on those 
issues that probe at the outer boundaries of liberalism.  That is, my 
interest is on those political commitments that—even if they may not 
lie wholly outside liberalism—may lie further from core liberal con-
cepts, or may be genuine innovations upon core liberal concepts, or 
may even be in tension with core liberal concepts. 
Thus in Parts II and III, I investigate two bodies of constitutional 
doctrine that lie on either side of a break-point in American constitu-
tional development.  Ultimately, this analysis in Parts II and III will 
aid in illuminating the Court’s varied approach to dealing with 
groups and societal differentiation in different doctrinal and histori-
cal contexts. 
That said, let me note two obstacles that may complicate this task 
from the outset.  First, the judicial rhetoric within the cases will not 
directly address the individualism versus group dichotomy.  I have de-
liberately focused on judicial opinions that explicitly address the in-
terests of groups or classes, thereby perhaps stacking the deck toward 
examining cases that cut against the individualistic focus of liberal-
ism.  Further, even with this potential stacking of the deck, one might 
still easily take the contrarian position and see the judicial concern 
for groups in these cases as merely a proxy for its more basic concern 
for individual rights.  Indeed the “contrarian” view is perhaps the 
 
 48 Stears, supra note 47, at 93–94 (emphasis in original). 
 49 See, e.g., Gerstle, supra note 47, at 1046 (acknowledging the limitations of liberalism’s flex-
ibility); Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (explaining the complications that an all-
encompassing conception of liberalism encounters when racism becomes a part of the 
discussion). 
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more conventional view of the gender equality and gay equality cases; 
arguably, the Court’s protection of women and gay persons as classes 
in these cases should be seen, first and foremost, as merely a means 
toward the judicial protection of the rights of individual women and 
individual gay persons.50  At the very least then, the opinions them-
selves will not, on their surface, directly settle questions about wheth-
er the Court has cared more about groups or individuals at different 
moments in time. 
Second and relatedly, the question of whether the Court is more 
inclined to emphasize sameness and equality or entrenched differen-
tiation in these opinions is also made difficult by the Justices’ diver-
gence on baseline assessments.  As discussed in more detail below, of-
tentimes a given Justice’s openness to “differential” legal treatment 
for a given group hinged greatly on that Justice’s evaluation of the in-
itial status quo baseline.  Depending upon whether a Justice felt that 
a given group enjoyed a rough parity with comparable groups, that 
Justice would or would not ultimately endorse differential treatment 
for the group in question.  Thus, given that a Justice’s intuitive analy-
sis of status quo conditions weighed so heavily in their analysis of 
group rights, a superficial reading of these cases is unlikely to tell us 
whether liberal ideology (more equality-focused) or a non-liberal 
ideology (more open to differentiation) is really structuring the 
Court’s analysis in these cases. 
Nevertheless, in Parts II and III below, I proceed by examining 
cases where groups articulated certain rights, and I interrogate the 
Court’s rhetoric and analysis surrounding the “sameness” or “differ-
ence” between those groups and other relevant groups.  I catalogue 
the array of sameness-arguments and difference-arguments made in 
the context of the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours legislation, 
 
 50 In J.E.B. v. Alabama, Justice Anthony Kennedy makes this comment in his concurrence: 
The Equal Protection Clause and our constitutional tradition are based on the 
theory that an individual possesses rights that are protected against lawless action 
by the government.  The neutral phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause, extend-
ing its guarantee to ‘any person,’ reveals its concern with rights of individuals, not 
groups (though group disabilities are sometimes the mechanism by which the 
State violates the individual right in question).  ‘At the heart of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must 
treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial [or] sexu-
al . . . class.’ 
  511 U.S. 127, 152–53 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Metro Broad., 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)); see also Mark G. Yudof, 
Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discriminiation:  One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1385 (1990) (arguing that equal protection 
is for individuals—with group membership being an incidential concern—and in fact 
“[t]he equal protection clause makes no mention of groups”). 
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and the post-Brown-era cases on gender and gay equality.  This analy-
sis will provide a foundation for subsequent discussion in Part IV on 
the relative importance of individual versus group and sameness ver-
sus differentiation ideals in the Court’s jurisprudence from these two 
eras.  I argue that we can indeed detect a significant, but subtle dif-
ference in the Court’s understanding of group rights across these 
cases, and that this difference stems from the judiciary’s changed re-
ceptivity to segmentation concerns.  Finally, in Part IV, I will elaborate 
on this distinction and flesh out the concept of segmentation as a dis-
tinctive mode of political and legal argument. 
II.  THE IMPARTIAL STATE 
From the late nineteenth century to the New Deal, the Court posi-
tioned itself in opposition to federal and state laws seeking to regu-
late, among other things, maximum hours and minimum wages for 
employees in various occupations.  The Court was largely hostile to 
such laws, striking many of them down for violating rights protected 
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
A conventional interpretation of these cases treats them as evi-
dence of the Court promoting laissez-faire values and the interests of 
business.51  However, a more convincing line of scholarship identifies 
a different analytical thread running through them.  To these “revi-
sionist” scholars, the Court’s Lochner-era cases reflected, above all else, 
a strain of Jacksonian political thought focused on the maintenance 
of an “impartial state.”52  An impartial state was desirable and neces-
sary to prevent the proliferation of “class legislation” where through 
its laws, the state would grant special privileges and favors to specific 
classes of citizens, to the detriment of other citizens.  A desire for 
equality in how the state treated its citizens was the normative goal of 
the Jacksonian-impartial state ideal.  The Court did allow for excep-
tions, however.  If a law sought to single out a particular class or 
group for a benefit or burden, the law could be justified as within the 
state’s legitimate police powers if it served the public interest in pro-
 
 51 For a discussion of this view, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED:  THE 
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1–4 (1993). 
 52 My use of the term “impartial state” in this Part, and my use of “partial state” in Part III, is 
descriptive; these terms are not meant to be taken as normative evaluations of the judici-
ary’s actions in these two periods.  That is, as a historical matter, the “impartial state” ide-
al structured a world-view many Lochner-era judges shared.  In contrast, for a more norma-
tively driven use and discussion of these terms in doctrinal contexts that overlap with 
some of the cases that I discuss, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 3–7, 
24–25, 75–81, 347, 350–53 (1993). 
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moting the health, safety, or general well-being of either the broader 
public or the group in question (if, say, the group in question were 
employed in a particularly dangerous occupation).53  As discussed be-
low, we do find the ideals and concerns of the impartial state perspec-
tive within the rhetoric of anti-reform judicial opinions during this 
period. 
The endorsement of an impartial state ideal in some of the judi-
cial opinions from the Lochner era might be seen as clear support for 
the Hartzian claim of a liberal consensus in America, at least among 
judicial actors.  A significant judicial fear did exist of state and federal 
legislation recognizing and entrenching class differentiation and 
segmentation in society; hence Court majorities at this time felt that 
the peculiar duty of the Court was to enforce equality with respect to 
how the state treated individuals.  Indeed, Hartzian-liberal ideals and 
commitments seem to have held sway among a majority of the Su-
preme Court at this time, with regard to these cases.  And yet, as evi-
denced in part by the fact that the Court allowed for differential legal 
treatment for certain groups during this period, other strains of 
American political thought can be glimpsed in the rhetoric of both 
the anti- and pro-reform voices on the Court as well. 
In the following parts, I draw from the economic rights cases of 
this era where either the majority or the dissenting opinions engaged 
in some explicit discussion of class or group interests.  What emerges 
from the opinions is that both anti- and pro-reform Justices deployed 
arguments about group sameness and difference.  That is, when con-
 
 53 See GILLMAN, supra note 51, at 1–4; see also id. at 10–14, 54–55 (arguing that “the Lochner 
era represented a serious, principled effort to maintain one of the central distinctions in 
nineteenth-century constitutional law—the distinction between valid economic regula-
tion, on the one hand, and invalid ‘class’ legislation, on the other”); Michael Les Bene-
dict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty:  A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Con-
stitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 298, 305–14 (1985) (explaining that under laissez-
faire economics, only certain kinds of government interference were permissible); Alan 
Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”:  A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. 
HIST. 751, 752–56, 758–60, 763–66, 771 (1967) (describing Cooley’s conception of a 
“constitutional government” and noting that Cooley’s writings “applied the term constitu-
tional only to those governments [who] . . . defined ‘the limits of its exercise so as to pro-
tect individual rights and shield them against the exercise of arbitrary power”); Charles 
W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations:  Some Parame-
ters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 971–74, 979–81, 994–
95, 1004–05 (1975) (describing post-Civil War constitutional controversies and noting 
that the Court had “both the power and the opportunity to forge new doctrine and fix 
new boundaries between the public and private sectors”); Yudof, supra note 50, at 1368–
71 (analyzing the Equal Protection Clause to illustrate an instance when the government 
was permitted to “employ protective measures” to benefit a specific group, even as it “as-
pire[d] to a more global concept of constitutional equality”). 
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fronted by reforms promoting certain group interests, Justices both 
favorable and opposed to the reform discussed the groups in ques-
tion by emphasizing its similarity and its difference from other groups 
in society.  But the payoff from the discussion below is not merely to 
demonstrate a diversity of arguments in the Court’s opinions.  More 
than this, the analysis provides a baseline from which to contrast the 
post-Brown jurisprudence on noneconomic rights that would appear 
decades later.  Even though both the Locher-era and post-Brown-era 
cases dealt with group interests, I will argue that the latter dealt with 
group interests in a markedly different way.  After discussing both the 
anti- and pro-reform perspectives on economic rights below, I con-
clude this Part with a brief discussion of the “universalistic” approach 
to group rights in these cases to help set up a more extended, subse-
quent discussion of how they diverge from the gender and gay equali-
ty cases that are the focus of Part III. 
A.  Anti-Reform Arguments on Economic Rights 
When confronted by federal and state statutes seeking to regulate 
the wages and hours of certain employees, those Supreme Court Jus-
tices predisposed toward an anti-reform perspective predictably em-
phasized the inherent sameness of the groups in question, relative to 
other groups.  Because the groups in question were no different from 
anyone else, these Justices argued, they should not get the benefit (or 
burden, depending upon one’s perspective) of specific legislative 
regulations governing their relationship with their employer.  This 
was an argument directly in line with the impartial state ideal. 
Thus in the Lochner case itself, the Supreme Court struck down a 
New York law providing for maximum hours for bakers as a violation 
of the freedom of the contract.54  Justice Rufus Peckham’s opinion for 
the majority emphasized that bakers as a class were in no obvious way 
disadvantaged in their ability to bargain with their employers over the 
terms of their labor.  As he stated: 
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence 
and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they 
are not able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the 
protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of 
judgment and of action.  They are in no sense wards of the state.55 
There was nothing particularly dangerous about the profession of a 
baker, and the public interest was not otherwise implicated in the 
 
 54 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
 55 Id. at 57. 
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context of baker employment.56  Hence bakers as a class should not 
be treated differently from other classes of workers. 
A similar sensibility appears among anti-reform Justices in the 
context of wages and hours legislation for female workers.  In Adkins 
v. Children’s Hospital, a majority of the Court struck down a minimum 
wage law for women and minors in the District of Columbia for in-
fringing upon the freedom of contract, as protected in the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.57  Justice George Sutherland, writ-
ing for the Court, asserted that with respect to wages, women were 
the equal of men and should not enjoy the special protection afford-
ed them in this legislation—especially with the Nineteenth Amend-
ment having been ratified only three years earlier.  Differences in 
physical stature were not relevant here.  As he stated: 
In this aspect of the matter, while the physical differences must be rec-
ognized in appropriate cases, and legislation fixing hours or conditions 
of work may properly take them into account, we cannot accept the doc-
trine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to 
restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be im-
posed in the case of men under similar circumstances.  To do so would 
be to ignore all the implications to be drawn from the present day trend 
of legislation, as well as that of common thought and usage, by which 
woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that she must be 
given special protection or be subjected to special restraint in her con-
tractual and civil relationships.58 
Likewise, similar anti-reform arguments regarding gender appear in 
Morehead v. New York, when the Court struck down a New York mini-
mum wage law for women and minors for violating the freedom of 
contract.59 
But if it is not surprising to see anti-reform arguments emphasiz-
ing sameness between the groups in question and other groups, anti-
reform Justices also deployed arguments emphasizing group differ-
ence too.  In Lochner, the topic of the relative unhealthiness of the 
baking profession came up for considerable discussion in both the 
majority opinion and in Justice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion.60  
Justice Peckham’s opinion for the Court both minimized any particu-
lar danger associated with the baking profession—as noted above—
 
 56 Id. at 57, 59. 
 57 261 U.S. 525, 559–62 (1923). 
 58 Id. at 553. 
 59 298 U.S. 587, 611 (1936); accord West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 411–13 (Sutherland, J., dis-
senting) (making similar arguments that “[d]ifference of sex affords no reasonable 
ground for making a restriction applicable to the wage contracts of all women from which 
like contracts of all working men are left free”). 
 60 198 U.S. at 70–71. 
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and went on to make the following argument:  even if baking may not 
be the most healthy of all professions, it was no worse than many oth-
er professions that were not presently the focus of New York state 
employment regulations.  Justice Peckham made this argument in the 
context of raising a slippery slope concern of endless legislative regu-
lation of occupations, if all that were needed to justify regulation was 
some sort of risk to an employee’s health.61  In other words, Justice 
Peckham acknowledged that the baking profession may not be exact-
ly the same as all other professions when it came to health risks.  But 
even if there may be some differences between it and others, the risks 
of being a baker lay well within an acceptable range of varying em-
ployment health risks: i.e., baking lay within an “acceptable” set of di-
verse occupations that did not require special legislative attention. 
B.  Pro-Reform Arguments on Economic Rights 
In contrast to the prior arguments, a different set of arguments 
were deployed by those Justices pressing a more pro-reform position.  
But even if they were different in their specifics, these pro-reform ar-
guments also emphasized group sameness and difference. 
Arguments emphasizing group difference were, not surprisingly, 
deployed by pro-reform Justices in these cases.  When a Justice sought 
to defend legislation setting minimum wages or maximum hours for 
a certain class of employees, a common move was to emphasize the 
distinctiveness of the occupation—either for its heightened potential 
health risk to workers or because workers in that occupation were 
hobbled by significantly unequal bargaining power with their em-
ployers.  One of the most important precedents establishing these 
principles was Holden v. Hardy, where the Court upheld a Utah statute 
establishing maximum hours for miners and those engaged “in the 
smelting, reduction, or refining of ores and metals.”62  The Court 
concluded that the law was within the police powers of the state of 
Utah, and did not violate liberty of contract, due process, or equal 
protection.63 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon a number of 
prior, legitimate incursions on the right of contract in the form of 
health and safety laws.64  With respect to the statute at issue in Holden 
specifically, Justice Henry Brown stated for the Court that 
 
 61 Id. at 59–61. 
 62 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See id. at 391–93 (describing the Court’s recent decisions in this area). 
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[w]e think the act in question may be sustained as a valid exercise of the 
police power of the State.  The enactment does not profess to limit the 
hours of all workmen, but merely those who are employed in under-
ground mines or in the smelting, reduction or refining of ores or metals.  
These employments, when too long pursued, the legislature has judged 
to be detrimental to the health of the employés, and, so long as there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that this is so, its decision upon this sub-
ject cannot be reviewed by the Federal courts.65 
Similar arguments regarding group difference were made by Justice 
Harlan in dissent in Lochner as well, where he cited to Holden.66 
The Court in Holden further noted that the law at issue there 
might be justified by a legislative belief in an inequality of bargaining 
power between employers and employees in this specific context: 
The legislature has also recognized the fact, which the experience of leg-
islators in many States has corroborated, that the proprietors of these 
[mining] establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an 
equality, and that their interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting.  The 
former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their 
employés, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to 
conform to regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would 
pronounce to be detrimental to their health or strength.  In other words, 
the proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are practically con-
strained to obey them.  In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe 
guide, and the legislature may properly interpose its authority.67 
Beyond the context of dangerous occupations, the Court also ex-
pressed some openness to allowing exceptions to the impartial state 
ideal with regulations governing the hours and wages of female and 
minor employees.  These arguments followed a different structure 
because the point of emphasis was less the particular kind of occupa-
tion in question, and more the peculiar obstacles faced by women 
and minors in the workplace.  Hence Justices sympathetic to wages 
and hours regulation for women emphasized the weaker physical 
stature of women in treating these regulations as health and safety 
measures; they emphasized the absence of equal bargaining power 
for female employees as a class; and they deployed civic republican-
 
 65 Id. at 395; see also id. at 396–97 (continuing to distinguish this group of laborers based on 
the hazards of their profession and arguing further that although “reasonable doubts may 
exist as to the power of the legislature to pass a law . . . to promote the health, safety or 
comfort of the people . . . we must resolve them in favor of the right of that department 
of government”). 
 66 198 U.S. at 66, 69–71. 
 67 Holden, 169 U.S. at 397; see also Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69 (“It may be that the statute had its 
origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employés in such establishments were not 
upon an equal footing . . . .”). 
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inspired arguments regarding the unique maternal role of women in 
ensuring the vitality of the nation and its populace. 
In Muller v. Oregon, a unanimous Court upheld an Oregon maxi-
mum hours law for female employees “in any mechanical establish-
ment, or factory, or laundry.”68  References to the greater relative 
physical weakness of women were combined with an appeal to the 
maternal obligations placed upon women in this comment by Justice 
David Brewer, for the Court: 
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal func-
tions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvi-
ous.  This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon 
her.  Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fra-
ternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this 
from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy 
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of 
woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to pre-
serve the strength and vigor of the race.69 
These characteristics thus made women fundamentally different from 
men, and justified governmental favoritism through labor regula-
tions:  “[d]ifferentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is 
properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her 
protection may be sustained even when like legislation is not neces-
sary for men and could not be sustained.”70  As noted above in the 
discussion of the Adkins case, Justice Sutherland had emphasized a 
basic sameness or similarity across gender with respect to the em-
ployment context, especially after the enactment of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in 1920.  In response, both Justices William Howard Taft 
and Oliver Holmes Jr. dissented in Adkins and converged on a key 
point:  because the differences in physical stature between men and 
women were so basic and consequential, they felt the Nineteenth 
Amendment should not be used to reduce labor protections afforded 
to women.71 
Likewise, in Morehead, a point of emphasis for Justice Charles 
Hughes in his dissent was the particular dangers faced by female and 
underage workers in seeking to bargain for their wages with employ-
ers: 
 
 68 208 U.S. 412, 416, 423 (1908). 
 69 Id. at 421; see also West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95, 398–99 (containing similar argu-
ments emphasizing the relatively greater physical weakness of women and their maternal 
function). 
 70 Muller, 208 at 422. 
 71 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 567 (Taft, J., dissenting); id. at 569 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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The Legislature finds that the employment of women and minors in 
trade and industry in the State of New York at wages unreasonably low 
and not fairly commensurate with the value of the services rendered is a 
matter of vital public concern; that many women and minors are not as a 
class upon a level of equality in bargaining with their employers in regard 
to minimum fair wage standards, and that ‘freedom of contract’ as ap-
plied to their relations with employers is illusory; that, by reason of the 
necessity of seeking support for themselves and their dependents, they 
are forced to accept whatever wages are offered; and that judged by any 
reasonable standard, wages in many instances are fixed by chance and 
caprice and the wages accepted are often found to bear no relation to 
the fair value of the service.72 
No surprise then that given the impartial state ideal, judicial de-
fenses of reforms seeking to carve out exceptions to that ideal would 
emphasize the distinctiveness of the groups that might enjoy special 
legal protections.  But even if a theme of group difference runs most 
prominently in these pro-reform arguments, an appeal to sameness 
can be found in these arguments as well, and it is implicit in the judi-
cial discussions of unequal bargaining power.  If the pro-reform Jus-
tices were claiming that certain occupations, or certain kinds of 
workers, faced substantial obstacles in attaining “equal” bargaining 
power with their employers toward earning “fair” wages or working 
“fair” hours, there was also an implicit assumption that something 
like equal bargaining power and fair hours/wages did in fact exist as 
the aspired normative goal.  That is, arguments regarding unequal 
bargaining power were implicitly positing a goal of sameness:  that 
workers in dangerous professions and female or underage employees 
needed the benefit of legislation to attain the same benefits for their 
labor that their adult, male counterparts in non-dangerous occupa-
tions enjoyed.  In short, a basic sameness in employee goals provided 
a significant portion of the normative appeal of these laws singling 
out certain groups for legal protections. 
Hence, pro-reform Justices employed arguments in these cases 
that referenced a “fair” or “living” wage.  This idea is referenced 
above at the end of the extended quotation by Justice Hughes in his 
Morehead dissent.  He followed up that quotation with this additional 
comment on the absence of fair wages for women: 
Inquiries by the New York State Department of Labor in cooperation 
with the Emergency Relief Bureau of New York City disclosed the large 
number of women employed in industry whose wages were insufficient for 
the support of themselves and those dependent upon them.  For that 
 
 72 Morehead, 298 U.S. at 626–27 (Hughes, J., dissenting); see also West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 
398–99 (contending that female workers need additional legal protections because of 
their limited bargaining power). 
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reason, they had been accepted for relief and their wages were being 
supplemented by payments from the Emergency Relief Bureau.73 
Note this comment by Justice Hughes again in West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish, where his opinion for the Court upheld a Washington state law 
setting minimum wages for women (and also overruled Adkins): 
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position 
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless 
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health 
and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon the 
community.  What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called 
upon to pay.  The bare cost of living must be met.74 
C.  Groups and the Impartial State 
Notwithstanding the variety of arguments used on both sides of 
the debate on wages and hours legislation, let me conclude this Part 
by discussing one basic similarity that runs through both the pro- and 
anti-reform arguments:  neither side proved hospitable to viewing 
group interests as separate from broader, more systematic interests.  
This perspective is most obvious in the context of group sameness ar-
guments which, from anti-reform Justices, essentially denied that cer-
tain groups had distinct, legitimate interests that should be legally-
recognized and promoted.  But this perspective, more notably, also 
arose within pro-reform arguments, particularly those arguments 
emphasizing group difference.  Even in group difference arguments 
favoring reform, group interests were closely linked to broader con-
cerns or goals that were systemic, and that transcended the interests 
of the group in question. 
One example of this includes pro-reform arguments linking the 
protection of certain groups to more universalistic goals such as the 
broader public’s health and safety; indeed, sometimes pro-reform ju-
dicial arguments treated the health and safety of certain employees as 
essentially equivalent to the health and safety of the broader public.75  
Another example is pro-reform judicial arguments linking wages and 
hours legislation for specific groups to the economy and broader 
goals such as promoting fair economic competition and industrial 
stability.  Indeed the goals of competition and industrial stability were 
mentioned approvingly by the Court in United States v. Darby, where 
the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)—which set 
 
 73 Morehead, 298 U.S. at 627 (Hughes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 74 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added). 
 75 See Holden, 169 U.S. at 395; West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 393–94. 
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maximum hours and a minimum wage for employees in the produc-
tion of goods for interstate commerce.76 
In one sense, this is hardly surprising.  The judicial emphasis on a 
broader public interest in these discussions speaks in part to the 
broader theory of the impartial state.  As noted above, the Court had 
consistently allowed for exceptions to that ideal in its rulings; it al-
lowed for laws—usually categorized as “health and safety” laws77—to 
specifically benefit or burden particular groups if such laws could be 
justified as serving the public interest and falling within general po-
lice powers.  Thus referencing benefits that might flow to other 
groups or society at large with class-specific legislation was a principle 
explicitly built into the doctrine itself. 
Still, the judicial focus on explicating how certain group interests 
served broader goals also appears to encompass an ideal that goes be-
yond this doctrinal principle.  Consider a second example:  the refer-
ences to the state’s interest in the maternal function of women, in 
support of labor protections for female employees.78  This argument 
certainly implicated health and safety considerations too.79  But it also 
invoked civic republican notions of the common good, and spoke to, 
or implied, broader notions of societal equity in relation to the wel-
fare of female workers.  That is, some of these arguments emphasized 
the burden imposed upon the broader taxpaying public when female 
workers were not paid a living wage.80  The state’s interest in protect-
ing female workers was thus motivated by more than just the benefits 
that would accrue to those particular workers.  Justice Hughes stated 
the following in his opinion for the Court in West Coast Hotel in up-
holding the minimum wage law for women at issue there:  “The com-
munity is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for uncon-
scionable employers.”81 
Finally, judicial efforts to link group-interests to broader commu-
nal and systemic goals appear in a third way:  a strategic instrumental-
ism intersects with the appeals to group interests in these cases.  In 
examining the arc of wages and hours legislation in the early twenti-
eth century, we can plausibly link the focus on particular groups in 
 
 76 312 U.S. 100, 109 n.1, 109–10, 122 (1941); see also Morehead, 298 U.S. at 626–27 (Hughes, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the larger social problem and burden placed on taxpayers aris-
ing out of female workers’ lower wages and weakened bargaining power). 
 77 See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58; see also GILLMAN, supra note 51, at 127–30. 
 78 See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421–22; Morehead, 298 U.S. at 629–30 (Hughes, J., dissenting); id. at 
633 (Stone, J., dissenting); West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95, 398. 
 79 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95, 398. 
 80 See Morehead, 298 U.S. at 635 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 81 300 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added). 
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these cases to a broader trend toward more universal hours and wag-
es legislation that culminated in the FLSA.  For example, the Nation-
al Consumers’ League, one of the crucial advocacy groups in the de-
velopment of labor standards legislation in the early twentieth 
century, purposefully focused on women-specific reforms as an “en-
tering wedge” strategy toward later securing wages and hours legisla-
tion for workers in general.82  Likewise, the decision to remain fo-
cused on female workers in future-Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous 
brief in Muller v. Oregon—a case he was shepherded to by the National 
Consumers’ League—was also a choice calculated toward securing 
judicial success and certainly not a reflection of Justice Brandeis’s be-
lief that labor protections should stop with female workers.83  Not 
surprisingly, by the time the Court confronted the FLSA in Darby, it 
explicitly referenced one of that statute’s concerns with establishing a 
“minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and 
general wellbeing of workers” in general.84  The focus on particular 
groups in these earlier cases might be seen as driven then, at least in 
part, by pragmatic political and judicial judgment toward securing a 
more universal reform, and less by the inherent distinctiveness of the 
groups themselves. 
I would tentatively assert here that judicial tendencies to think of 
group interests as tied to broader, more systemic or universalistic 
goals is a distinctive feature of these arguments in the wages and 
hours cases, during these years.  In contrast, as I will discuss in the 
remainder of this Article, group-focused arguments from the late 
twentieth to the early twenty-first century on gender and gay equality 
have been characterized by some key, distinct rhetorical elements.  I 
turn now to examine some more recent constitutional cases. 
III.  THE PARTIAL STATE 
If the notion of an impartial state held sway in the Lochner era with 
respect to wages and hours legislation, much of the Court’s post-
 
 82 LANDON R.Y. STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM:  THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE, 
WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA 2–4, 6, 42, 46, 58 
(2000).  The National Consumers’ League was also involved in the effort to pass the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.  Id. at 177, 183, 185. 
 83 Id. at 44–45; PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS:  BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 60 (1993); PHILIPPA 
STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS:  JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 128 (1984).  Strum notes that “[b]y 
far the largest share of the work on the brief was done by [Josephine] Goldmark,” who 
was Justice Brandeis’s sister-in-law and who also worked as the research director of the 
National Consumers’ League.  STRUM, BRANDEIS:  BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra, at 60; 
STORRS, supra note 82, at 44. 
 84 Darby, 312 U.S. at 109. 
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Brown v. Board of Education jurisprudence on noneconomic rights 
might be characterized as subscribing to the notion of a partial state.  
That is, during this period the Court expressed greater explicit 
openness to the idea of the state, and the judiciary especially, engag-
ing in targeted actions to benefit specific social groups. 
As noted above, the partial state ideal was indeed suggested in 
Footnote Four of Carolene Products; Justice Stone’s majority opinion 
contained a strong statement of judicial deference to elected bodies 
on economic rights, while also demarcating certain areas where the 
Court might remain assertive and scrutinize legislative actions to a 
greater degree.  Among these areas were those noted in Footnote 
Four’s third paragraph:  laws that targeted “religious,” “national,” or 
“racial” minorities, or laws that encompassed “prejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities.”85  The Footnote’s third paragraph thus 
spoke to the notion of the Court engaging in class politics benefitting 
a minority social group, and due in no small part to this, John Hart 
Ely focused on Footnote Four as a justification for much of the War-
ren Court’s subsequent rights jurisprudence.86 
Let me then briefly articulate key elements of the partial state per-
spective that emerge in some of the Court’s opinions during the post-
Brown era.  First, if the dominant judicial fear of the Lochner-era Court 
was a legislative process descending into pork barrel legislation and 
rampant favoritism to certain classes, the dominant fear within the 
partial state perspective is a legislature inclined to ignore or harm the 
interests and rights of certain groups.  When the interests of these 
unfortunate groups are ignored or harmed, key problems emerge:  
members of these groups are denied “equal concern and respect” 
and the functioning of democratic processes is fundamentally im-
paired.87  Second, in response to these problems, the partial state ide-
al would have the state—and the Court especially—engage in class 
politics to correct for these flaws.  This is more or less the opposite of 
the prescriptions of the impartial state. 
In the cases that follow, I draw attention to one similarity and one 
point of divergence between the post-Brown cases on gender and gay 
equality and the Lochner-era cases on economic rights.  The similarity 
 
 85 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 86 ELY, supra note 5, at 75–77.  To be sure, to say that the Court has “favored” certain minori-
ty groups carries some crucial presumptions, and is complicated by the question of what 
the proper analytical baseline is for determining “favoritism.”  I will explore this point in 
greater detail below. 
 87 Id. at 74–77, 82, 84–85,103–04.  In discussing the notion of equal concern and respect, Ely 
relied on the work of Ronald Dworkin.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 180 (1977). 
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is this:  in the gender and gay equality cases, we again see that both 
the pro- and anti-reform arguments put forth by Justices appeal to 
themes of group sameness and group difference. 
At the same time, there is a crucial difference between these cases 
and the Lochner-era cases:  if pro-reform arguments in the Lochner era 
appealed to group interests in a broader, more systemic or more in-
strumental manner, such concerns seem to be more subdued in the 
post-Brown cases.  Larger, more systemic goals encompassing other 
social groups or the broader polity do not seem to color the Court’s 
discussion of group rights to the same degree here.  Rather, the 
Court appears more engaged in class politics, largely to the benefit of 
only the group in question.  Thus, the partial state perspective aligns 
well with notions of societal segmentation, a concept that I will begin to 
flesh out in this Part. 
A final note on case selection:  in the discussion below, my focus is 
only on the Court’s gender and sexual orientation cases where the 
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions devoted some explicit 
attention to group interests.  I focus on these two bodies of doctrine 
because they constitute two of the most visible and important exam-
ples of judicial assertiveness against conflicting prior doctrine, and 
conflicting federal and state statutes.  I have, however, bypassed a dis-
cussion of Brown itself and the post-Brown cases on race and equal 
protection.  This is partly because the gender and sexual orientation 
cases arguably present better case studies of judicial assertiveness; 
while the Court’s post-civil rights era jurisprudence on race was built 
upon a foundation of earlier judicial precedents and pivotal congres-
sional statutes, there had been no such legislative basis for the doc-
trinal shifts in gender and gay equality.  As a result, the judicial articu-
lation of rights in the latter contexts was relatively more dependent 
upon the judiciary’s own reasoning. 
A.  Pro-Reform Arguments on Gender and Gay Equality 
Within pro-reform arguments in the context of gender and gay 
rights, appeals to similarity and difference are tightly intertwined and 
often deployed in the same sentences.  With respect to sameness, pro-
reform arguments tend to begin with the assumption of a normative 
baseline that is assumed to be universal and equal for all relevant so-
cial groups.  But from this assumption of equality, pro-reform legal 
conclusions follow in those cases where certain social groups—which 
should be treated on an equal footing with their legitimate analogues 
(“like cases”)—are found to be facing severe legal and social inequali-
ties under status quo conditions.  That is, it is the status quo condi-
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tion of “difference” for certain unfortunate social groups that justifies 
a corresponding judicial action to treat these groups differently—and 
more favorably—to counteract an unfair set of baseline conditions 
and return them to “equality.”  The justification for differential and 
beneficial treatment for certain groups, by the Court, stems from a 
perceived, initial departure from equality. 
The basic shape of this argument is familiar enough for anyone 
who has read these cases or the Court’s cases on race-based affirma-
tive action, and it mirrors President Lyndon Johnson’s notable com-
ments analogizing the problems of racial inequality to the rules of a 
foot race: 
But freedom is not enough.  You do not wipe away the scars of centuries 
by saying:  Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, 
and choose the leaders you please.  You do not take a person who, for 
years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the 
starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the 
others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.88 
Still, while this same argument reappears in the context of gender 
and gay equality, it does carry some additional subtleties in the latter 
two contexts.  With respect to gender, pro-reform arguments were in-
fluenced by the Court’s earlier rulings in race and equal protection, 
and emphasized a long history of discrimination against women to 
justify the application of heightened scrutiny to gender classifications.  
For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Court over-
turned a system of military benefits for dependents that imposed 
greater burdens on female military members.89  The Court justified 
the application of heightened scrutiny by discussing the presence of 
gender discrimination, paternalism, and archaic stereotypes against 
women in law and society, leading to the imposition of legal disabili-
ties upon women at different historical periods, including the inabil-
ity to hold office, serve on juries, or vote.90 
Similarly, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court 
ruled that a Mississippi public university that maintained an all-
female nursing program (and that denied admission to a male appli-
 
 88 Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, Commencement Address at Howard 
University: To Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnson/ archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp. 
 89 411 U.S. 677, 684–87, 688 (1973). 
 90 Id.; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–27 (1982) (noting that 
“[c]are must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic 
and stereotypic” notions of gender); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135–36 (arguing that “this Court 
consistently has subjected gender-based classifications to heightened scrutiny in recogni-
tion of the real danger that government policies that professedly are based on reasonable 
considerations” may reflect archaic generalizations about gender). 
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cant on those grounds) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.91  In doing so, the Court majority found 
that the university perpetuated the archaic stereotype of nursing as a 
profession only for women.92  And in United States v. Virginia, the 
Court ruled that the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”), a public mili-
tary university, violated the Equal Protection Clause by excluding 
women from admission.93  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion for 
the Court emphasized an extended history of discrimination against 
women,94 and she noted that while gender differences may exist and 
could be celebrated, they could not be deployed to subordinate or 
otherwise harm the interests of women.95 
Recall the comments of Justices Taft and Holmes’ dissent in Ad-
kins, when they stated their skepticism about the Nineteenth 
Amendment eliminating the need for protective legislation for fe-
male employees.  In a similar vein, Justice William Brennan voiced 
skepticism in his opinion for the Court in Frontiero that advances for 
women over the latter half of the twentieth century were sufficient to 
eliminate the need for judicial action protective of women.  In com-
menting on the unique pervasiveness of gender stereotypes, Justice 
Brennan stated that: 
It is true, of course, that the position of women in America has improved 
markedly in recent decades.  Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, 
in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still 
face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our edu-
cational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, 
in the political arena.96 
The race-gender analogy was often made explicit in these cases, 
since both kinds of social identities arguably had a similar nature:  
they were individual characteristics imposed arbitrarily at birth, and 
they had the effect of diminishing the opportunities and benefits of 
those individuals assigned a more “inferior” status by society.  As Jus-
tice Brennan stated in Frontiero: 
And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence 
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is 
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to per-
form or contribute to society.  As a result, statutory distinctions between 
the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of 
 
 91 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729–30. 
 92 Id. 
 93 518 U.S. 515, 565 (1996). 
 94 Id. at 531–32. 
 95 Id. at 533–34. 
 96 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685–86 (footnotes omitted). 
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females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of 
its individual members.97 
Judicial arguments defending the special, favored treatment of 
groups because of the distinctive disabilities faced by those groups is a 
familiar point.  But embedded within these comments on the peculi-
ar disabilities faced by women are also implicit assumptions of same-
ness—namely, the assumption of a universal, fair baseline from which 
the Court might make judgments about the welfare and treatment of 
individuals.  Indeed, the Court’s belief that women had been treated 
by the law and civil society in ways that diverged from this baseline—
to the detriment of women as a class—was what justified the differen-
tial treatment of women (and the application of heightened scrutiny 
for gender classifications) by the judiciary.98  Hence the Court’s dis-
cussion of pernicious stereotypes against women is intertwined with 
concerns about how such stereotypes pervert judgments that should 
be based upon merit or performance—a fairer baseline, as the Court 
often implied.  In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court ruled that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited gender-based jury selection, and disal-
lowed the state’s use of gender-based peremptory challenges.99  In 
Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in this case, he stat-
ed: 
Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular 
views simply because of their gender is ‘practically a brand upon them, 
affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority.’  Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).  It denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror, 
and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of exclusion from political partici-
pation.  The message it sends to all those in the courtroom, and all those 
who may later learn of the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals, 
for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state ac-
tors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons could 
disagree.100 
Similar kinds of arguments appear in the pro-reform judicial opin-
ions on gay rights.  In the three opinions discussed below, all au-
thored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, there is a baseline presumption 
of sameness between gay persons and other social groups—to be free 
 
 97 Id. at 686–87 (footnotes omitted); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135–36.  For an extremely 
detailed historical analysis of the race-gender analogy, as deployed by feminist legal advo-
cates, see generally SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011). 
 98 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87. 
 99 511 U.S. at 138–42. 
100 Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted); accord. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 543–45 (arguing that the justi-
fications for excluding all women from citizen-soldier training are not “exceedingly per-
suasive”). 
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of animus, prejudice, and certain legal disabilities—and judicial ac-
tion is subsequently necessary when laws exist that treat gay persons 
in a different, less favorable way.  That is, targeted judicial action in 
defense of gay rights is justified by the prior presence of targeted dis-
crimination against gay persons in past precedents or legislation.  
Thus in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down Amendment 2 to Col-
orado’s state constitution.101  Amendment 2 prohibited antidiscrimi-
nation laws at the state and local level for persons based on their 
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships.”102  One of the crucial components of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Court was his emphasis on the targeted discriminato-
ry nature of Amendment 2.  He emphasized that only gay persons 
were targeted with the particular legal disability contained within it: 
Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with respect to 
transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres.  
The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific le-
gal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids 
reinstatement of these laws and policies.103 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy asserted that animus against the entire 
class of gay persons was the real motivation behind Amendment 2.104 
Likewise, in Lawrence v. Texas the Court struck down Texas’s anti-
sodomy statute, targeted only at gay persons, as a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.105  Justice Kennedy, 
again writing for the Court, argued that the anti-sodomy statute took 
something away from gay persons that all others were able to enjoy, 
and that went beyond the mere act of sex: 
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport 
to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act.  Their penalties and 
 
101 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 627; see also id. at 627–31 (describing other ways in which Amendment 2 restricted 
homosexuals).  Notably, Justice Kennedy also invoked the precedent of the Civil Rights 
Cases: 
  [Amendment 2] is a status based enactment divorced from any factual context from 
which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification 
of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does 
not permit.  ‘[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment . . . .’  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., at 24. 
Id. at 635; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (making similar comments about the Texas anti-sodomy statute at issue). 
104 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(commenting on the insufficiency of “moral disapproval” of gay persons as a legitimate 
state purpose under the Equal Protection Clause in the context of the anti-sodomy statute 
at issue). 
105 539 U.S. at 567.  
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purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon 
the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most pri-
vate of places, the home.  The statutes do seek to control a personal rela-
tionship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is 
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as crimi-
nals.106 
Furthermore, the criminalization of this conduct by the state car-
ried with it certain stigma harms that would attach only to gay per-
sons, and that would remain even if the Court were to use the Equal 
Protection Clause to strike the law down, rather than the Due Process 
Clause: 
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains 
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it 
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.  When ho-
mosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declara-
tion in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to dis-
crimination both in the public and in the private spheres.  The central 
holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it 
should be addressed.  Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of 
homosexual persons.107 
Finally, all of the preceding themes of animus, stigma harms, and 
the imposition of a significant and targeted legal disability reappear 
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Wind-
sor.108  There, the Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act’s 
(“DOMA”) definition of marriage as “a legal union between one man 
and one woman” for federal purposes as a violation of Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process.109  In doing so, Justice Kennedy viewed this defini-
tion in DOMA as singling out gay persons for a legal disability with 
real consequences—both financial and in the form of a stigma 
harm.110  Furthermore, he viewed DOMA as being motivated by a goal 
of animus against gay persons, which justified the Court’s subsequent 
actions in defense of their rights: 
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom 
same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their mar-
riage is less worthy than the marriages of others.  The federal statute is 
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to 
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
 
106 Id.; accord. id. at 574 (noting that “our laws and traditions afford constitutional protec-
tion” to intimate  and private decisions that are “central to personal dignity and autono-
my”). 
107 Id. at 575; see also id. at 575–76, 578 (describing in further detail the “collateral conse-
quences” of the anti-sodomy statute). 
108 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
109 Id. at 2695. 
110 Id. at 2692–95. 
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sought to protect in personhood and dignity.  By seeking to displace this 
protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respect-
ed than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.111 
B.  Anti-Reform Arguments on Gender and Gay Equality 
If Justice Kennedy’s opinions dominate the discussion of gay 
rights on the pro-reform side, Justice Antonin Scalia’s arguments 
dominate the discussion on the anti-reform side.  Very similar to the 
anti-reform arguments put forth during the Lochner era, one argu-
ment repeated by Justice Scalia was to deemphasize differences be-
tween women or gay persons, relative to those groups not receiving 
special judicial protection.  Thus in his dissent in United States v. Vir-
ginia, Justice Scalia questioned whether it made sense to treat women 
as a disempowered minority at all.  They were not a numerical minor-
ity—making them not analogous to racial minorities—and federal 
legislative victories for women’s rights suggested that they were not 
lacking in political influence either.  Justice Scalia further noted that 
the apparent assumption of pro-reform Justices that women as a 
group lacked the ability to properly exert their potential political 
power suggested a kind of paternalism in its own right that was simi-
lar to what the pro-reform Court majority found troubling in VMI’s 
actions.112 
Similarly, in the context of gay rights, Justice Scalia was unsympa-
thetic to the notion of gay persons constituting a weaker political 
class.  To the contrary, in his Romer dissent he emphasized that gay 
rights advocates had demonstrated their ability to successfully navi-
gate the political process with victories at the local and state level pri-
or to Amendment 2.113  More pointedly, in both his Romer and Law-
rence dissents, he suggested that gay rights advocates were actually 
placed in a more favored position relative to other social groups be-
cause of the close alignment in ideology between them and members 
of the legal elite.  As he stated in his Lawrence dissent: 
Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-
profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual 
agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual ac-
tivists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally 
attached to homosexual conduct. . . . [M]any Americans do not want 
persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their 
 
111 Id. at 2696; see also id. at 2693–95. 
112 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
113 Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their chil-
dren’s schools, or as boarders in their home.  They view this as protecting 
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be im-
moral and destructive.  The Court views it as ‘discrimination’ which it is 
the function of our judgments to deter.  So imbued is the Court with the 
law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly una-
ware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously ‘main-
stream’ . . . .114 
Stated more precisely, in the Romer case, Justice Scalia viewed the ini-
tial anti-discrimination legislative protecting gay persons at the state 
and local level as a legitimate kind of class politics favoring that 
group.  In response, the passage of Amendment 2 was, in his estima-
tion, also a legitimate, political response to remove that prior, favora-
ble legislation, and to place gay persons back on the same equal foot-
ing as everyone else.  As he stated of Amendment 2, “[t]he people of 
Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does 
not even disfavor homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely 
denies them preferential treatment.”115 
By contesting the presumption of constitutionally significant ine-
qualities for women or gay persons in the status quo, Justice Scalia 
thus viewed the Court’s subsequent actions in defense of their rights 
not as corrective or as remedial, but as a kind of pure favoritism—i.e., 
the kind of class legislation that inspired the ideal of an impartial 
state as a corrective.  In his Romer dissent, he stated: 
Since the Constitution of the United States says nothing about this sub-
ject, it is left to be resolved by normal democratic means, including the 
democratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions.  This Court has 
no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the 
elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected, pro-
nouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil.116 
Similar arguments appear in his Lawrence dissent as well.117 
Alongside these appeals to the inherent sameness between wom-
en, gay persons, and other less judicially favored social groups, Justice 
Scalia does make an argument regarding group difference as well.  It 
is clear that in each of these controversies, there is no purely neutral 
 
114 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
115 Romer, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 637, 638–39 (arguing further 
that the only “equal treatment” denied to homosexuals as a result of Amendment 2 was 
the ability to obtain “preferential treatment”).  This was also the state of Colorado’s posi-
tion on Amendment 2, which the Court majority rejected.  Id. at 626 (majority opinion). 
116 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 646, 652–53 (stat-
ing a concern with a particular class of individuals becoming the impetus for such a shift 
from traditional values). 
117 539 U.S. at 602–03 (Scalia., J., dissenting). 
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outcome.  Under the status quo prior to judicial intervention, wom-
en—but not men—are denied admission into VMI, and gay per-
sons—but not straight persons—are placed at a legal disadvantage in 
being subject to Colorado’s Amendment 2, Texas’s anti-sodomy stat-
ute, and the definition of marriage within DOMA.  With the Court’s 
actions, women and gay persons are freed of these legal disabilities.  
Justice Scalia recognizes, of course, that women and gay persons 
would be subject to a different, and smaller set of legal entitle-
ments—relative to other social groups—if the Court were to forego 
action in these cases.  But he critiqued the Court’s actions, and stated 
his preference for a default to the status quo and its differential 
treatment for women and gay persons, with the claim that status quo 
conditions were well within the bounds of acceptable, pluralistic, 
democratic politics. 
That is, the prospect of different social groups enjoying different 
legal entitlements was acceptable so long as this did not run afoul of 
constitutional guarantees.  In a sense then, Justice Scalia made it 
clear that he was fine with class politics, and he was fine with some 
differential treatment of different groups under the law, so long as it 
was legitimate class politics done by legislatures.  Judicially led class 
politics, however, was a different matter, and that was how he would 
describe the Court’s intervention in these cases.  As he stated in his 
Lawrence dissent: 
Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other 
group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means.  So-
cial perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and every 
group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such 
matters is the best.  That homosexuals have achieved some success in that 
enterprise is attested to by the fact that Texas is one of the few remaining 
States that criminalize private, consensual homosexual acts.  But persuad-
ing one’s fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one’s views in ab-
sence of democratic majority will is something else.  I would no 
more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts—or, for that matter, 
display any moral disapprobation of them—than I would forbid it to do 
so.  What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional 
democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the inven-
tion of a brand-new ‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of 
democratic change.118 
That is, gay rights advocates should not be allowed to have the Court 
bail them out when they lose in the democratic arena. 
 
118 539 U.S. at 603 (Scalia., J., dissenting); see also id. at 602–05 (arguing further that the 
democratic process, not the Courts, should resolve these matters).  For a similar com-
ment in his Romer dissent, see 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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IV.  SEGMENTATION ARGUMENTS AND THE POST-BROWN-ERA CASES ON 
GENDER AND GAY EQUALITY 
As noted before, one basic similarity runs across the Lochner-era 
cases and the more recent cases on gender and sexual orientation: 
pro-reform and anti-reform judges in both eras employed arguments 
about group sameness and group difference when discussing group 
interests.  Yet notwithstanding this similarity, arguments in defense of 
group interests in the context of gender and gay equality diverge in 
one key regard from such arguments in the Lochner-era cases. 
By way of beginning to flesh out this claim, let us first consider the 
most obvious difference between these two sets of cases: the nature of 
the groups involved in each era.  In the Lochner era, there was an em-
phasis on specific types of employees (and by implication specific 
types of employers):  for example, miners, bakers, and those who 
employed them.  Hence the judicial focus in these cases was on the 
nature of certain kinds of economic relationships, and this was true 
even when the subjects of litigation were female or underage workers.  
Professional identity, gender identity, or age identity were relevant in 
these cases only to the extent that it held implications for both evalu-
ating the nature of an employment relationship, and helping judges 
determine whether wages or hours legislation was appropriate for 
certain workers or not. 
In contrast, no such consistent focus exists within the more recent 
gender and gay equality cases—at least with respect to the immediate 
focus of litigation in these cases.  Again, these cases dealt with diverse 
topics such as admission to a public university, an anti-sodomy statute, 
and gay marriage.  What joins them and makes them appropriate for 
comparison are the subjects of litigation in these cases, and the 
shared identities of these subjects.  That is, these cases are commonly 
grouped together and treated as gender equality or gay equality cases 
precisely because they implicate issues dealing with two groups that 
are commonly defined by social status—i.e., these cases concern so-
cial groups.119 
Carolene Products’ Footnote Four discussed groups that are “dis-
crete and insular,” which has had great effect in how scholars have 
theorized about the judiciary’s relationship with social groups.120  But 
 
119 On the topic of group status in American constitutional law, see J.M. Balkin, The Constitu-
tion of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321–42 (1997).  On the theory of social groups, see IRIS 
MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 42–48 (1990). 
120 See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 122–23 and accompanying 
text.  For a critique of judicial and scholarly focus on group discreteness and insularity, 
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perhaps a more precise—and, I believe, relatively non-controversial—
description of these social groups that have earned special judicial so-
licitude since the New Deal era would include the following elements.  
First, the group possesses a significant degree of “permanence” such 
that one’s membership in the group is, or the social characteristics 
that help define the group are, relatively non-fluid as a matter of so-
cial relations.  Footnote Four’s reference to “discrete” groups offers a 
narrower formulation of this idea.  Second, the social characteristics 
that help define the group and its members are largely perceived by 
the broader society to be central to a group member’s identity.  That 
is, these social characteristics are not easily shed for most individuals, 
in the same way that one’s age or professional identity might change.  
Finally, especially when the judiciary takes the initiative to defend 
these groups, such actions are usually supported by a prevailing 
sense—at least among the judiciary and often among a majority of 
the electorate as well—of an unfair social disadvantage accompanying 
group membership.121 
Beyond this rather obvious point that the kinds of groups impli-
cated in the later cases were distinct from the kinds of groups impli-
cated in the Lochner-era cases, the contemporary Court’s focus on so-
cial groups points to a second and more important difference 
between these two eras.  Recall that in the context of the Lochner-era 
 
see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–31, 745–46 
(1985). 
121 This description draws on prior discussions of this topic in the following works:  YOUNG, 
supra note 119, at 42–48; Balkin, supra note 120, at 2359–60; Robert M. Cover, The Origins 
of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1294–95 (1982); Owen 
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107, 148–50 (1976); 
Vernon Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness:  For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 607, 610 (1975) 
(reviewing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).  Groups defined by social status 
are distinct from alternative conceptions of groups modeled on notions of “association” 
or “aggregates”—the latter two being more prevalent in pluralist theories of political sci-
ence.  As Young notes, aggregates are defined as collections of individuals sharing certain 
attributes, and associations are groups constituted by individuals sharing practices and 
norms.  YOUNG, supra note 119, at 43–44.  In contrast to the possibly impersonal, abstract 
nature of aggregate groups, social groups are instead constituted by the nature of how 
group members are situated and positioned in relation to one another and in relation to 
non-group members.  Similarly, this characteristic of social groups also speaks to how they 
are distinct from associations.  IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 89–90 
(2000).  In earlier work, Young went further in differentiating social groups from aggre-
gates and associations.  She argued that while social groups may not “exist” apart from 
their individual members, they are not mere collections of fully formed individuals either.  
Unlike aggregates and associations, she claimed that social groups partially constitute the 
social identities of their members.  YOUNG, supra note 119, at 42–44.  For her subsequent 
comments on the relationship between identity and social groups, see YOUNG, INCLUSION 
AND DEMOCRACY, supra at 99–102. 
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cases, pro-reform arguments emphasizing the distinctiveness of pro-
tected groups—relative to all other economic groups that would not 
be protected by legislation—often had some link to broader, more 
systemic reform goals.  For example, pro-reform arguments for spe-
cific groups linked the protective legislation at issue to the public in-
terest (which was an explicit doctrinal principle within the case law), 
the broader economy, or the vitality of the nation and the American 
populace through the maternal role of female workers.  Further-
more, when examined in whole, the broader legislative effort—and 
subsequent judicial acquiescence—toward wages and hours regula-
tions for workers in general suggested that the earlier, more targeted 
reforms seeking protection of certain economic groups might plausi-
bly be seen as instrumental to the larger, more universal goal. 
In contrast, such broader goals are less apparent with the more 
recent judicial emphasis on group difference in the gender and gay 
equality cases.  The judicial solicitude for these groups appears to ex-
tend only to the protected groups, with no larger goals driving the 
Court’s actions—and certainly no explicit doctrinal requirement akin 
to the Lochner-era demand that class-specific reform legislation serve 
the public interest.  Indeed, in the Court’s discussion of group rights 
and interests in the more recent cases, its focus is on the very specific 
and targeted legal disabilities these groups have suffered.  Document-
ing these disabilities was a crucial early step in the Court’s analysis in 
these cases, and it generally provided the basis for very specific and 
targeted judicial remedies.  As we have seen, group-specific past 
harms and group-specific legal remedies were crucial elements of the 
arguments in pro-reform gender and gay equality opinions. 
One might say that perhaps the Court’s actions in these cases are 
plausibly tied to broader goals like perfecting democratic procedures 
or ensuring some universal, equal level of status and respect for all.122  
But even if such concerns have motivated these cases, they are seem-
ingly more subdued here compared to the broader, systemic con-
cerns at work in the wages and hours cases from the Lochner era.  In 
 
122 Ely focused on these themes in discussing the jurisprudence of the Warren Court and in 
elaborating on his normative theory of judicial review.  ELY, supra note 5, at 74–77, 82, 84–
85, 103–04.  I should note, perhaps one exception to my argument among the cases I dis-
cuss is J.E.B. v. Alabama, where the Court’s pro-reform ruling was linked to broader com-
munal interests.  See 511 U.S. at 140, 142 (noting that “[d]iscrimination in jury selection, 
whether based on race or gender,” harms not only those who are excluded but also the 
community at large).  However, communal interests were likely relevant there less be-
cause of the gender equality issue, and more because of that ruling’s focus on the per-
emptory challenge, and accompanying questions concerning the integrity of the legal sys-
tem.  
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the more recent cases, the rights and interests of certain groups merit 
judicial solicitude simply because those groups (or the individual 
members of those groups) were determined by the Court to merit its 
solicitude. 
To be sure, and as noted above, the judicial protection of group 
interests can be seen as either a defense of group rights (at least part-
ly) for its own sake, or merely as a means toward protecting the rights 
of individual group members.  But regardless of whether the Court 
may ultimately be more concerned with groups or with individual 
group members, what nevertheless emerges from the contemporary 
cases is a judicial outlook more accepting of societal segmentation.  
Given the Court’s focus on groups defined by more permanent, cen-
tral, and disadvantaging social characteristics, and given the absence 
of more visible universal goals driving legal reform, the key units of 
analysis for the Court in these cases are fixed, relatively unchanging 
groups.  Thus, while majorities of the Court have remained commit-
ted to liberal notions of individualism and equality across individuals 
in these cases on gender and gay equality, they have also pressed 
forth a group-centered perspective—and an openness to differentia-
tion across groups—in a way not shown by Court majorities in the 
Lochner-era cases. 
This greater emphasis on groups and group differentiation carries 
two sets of implications for themes in American political thought.  
The first is that the post-Brown cases hint at a distinct mode of politi-
cal or legal argument reflecting a theme of societal segmentation.  To 
be clear, I make no claim that this mode of argument is unique to the 
race, gender, or gay equality cases, nor that it is distinct to post-New 
Deal-era jurisprudence.  To the contrary, I believe segmentation 
themes appear episodically throughout American history, in a variety 
of different institutional and policy contexts.  The Court rulings on 
gender and gay equality discussed here are merely one recent exam-
ple of this form of argument.123 
 
123 Though I will have to defer a more extended discussion of the race cases and segmenta-
tion to future work, a few observations are worth mentioning at this point.  First, notions 
of segmentation are, without question, prominent within some of the Court’s opinions 
that promoted and aided the interests of racial minorities.  Consider this comment by 
Justice William Strong for the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, where the Court struck 
down a state law excluding African Americans from jury service: 
  At the time when they [the Reconstruction Amendments] were incorporated into the 
Constitution, it required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those 
who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly 
raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, 
and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that 
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Segmentation arguments, as I define them, invoke a description 
of society that might be gleaned in legal and political arguments.124  
 
had before existed.  Discriminations against them had been habitual.  It was well 
known that in some States laws making such discriminations then existed, and others 
might well be expected.  The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in 
that condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior intel-
ligence.  Their training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the 
protection which a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect 
themselves.  They especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States 
where they were resident.  It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth 
Amendment was framed and adopted. 
  100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880); see also id. at 306–09 (describing further the backdrop against 
which the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified). 
   Present within this comment, alongside racist-paternalist sentiments, are the familiar 
themes of judicial solicitude for a particular social group based upon the targeted harms 
suffered by that group.  A more recent example may be found in Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun’s separate opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
where in voting to uphold the U.C. Davis affirmative action program, they stated that 
“[t]he lingering effects of past discrimination continue to make race-conscious remedial 
programs appropriate means for ensuring equal educational opportunity in universities.”  
438 U.S. 265, 373 (1978); see also id. at 359, 362, 373–74 (arguing further that the purpose 
of the program, to “overcome the effects of segregation by bringing the races together,” 
was justifiable). 
   Second, however, the race cases may diverge from the gender and gay equality cases 
in that broader, systemic interests have been articulated by the Court to justify rulings 
that plausibly benefit racial minorities.  For example, in Brown v. Board of Education itself, 
the Court supported its ruling striking down segregated public schooling by emphasizing 
the importance of public education both for African-American children and for the 
broader society as well.  347 U.S. at 493–94.  On the latter point, Chief Justice Earl War-
ren stated that “[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for ed-
ucation both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our demo-
cratic society.  It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”  Id. at 
493.  Consider also the Court’s more recent rulings in defense of race-based affirmative 
action, where such policies are defended in the name of diversity interests that serve a 
broad array of interests:  the interests of minority student beneficiaries of these programs, 
the interests of non-minority classmates whose learning is enhanced by this diversity, and 
society-wide interests in cultivating active and knowledgeable citizenship and leadership 
among all racial groups.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315–16, 330–32 
(2003); Bakke, 438 U.S. at  311–15. 
   Thus, in the Court’s rulings benefitting racial minorities, we find themes and argu-
ments that both overlap and seemingly diverge from the segmentation themes that ap-
pear in the context of the gender and gay equality cases.  My tentative belief is that these 
points of divergence in the race cases reflect the peculiar political, institutional, and intel-
lectual context in which the rise of strict scrutiny, and the judicial antipathy to racial clas-
sifications, first solidified in the doctrine in the middle to the latter part of the twentieth 
century.  Further, the Court’s conceptualization of racial minority groups in its more re-
cent cases reflects a mix of the ideas and arguments from both this earlier, formative pe-
riod, and from its more recent cases in the post-Civil Rights era. 
124 The precise relationship between segmentation arguments—as I define them—and the 
wide array of other arguments in American politics stressing “pluralism” is a large topic 
that I will have to leave for future work.  However, for a short, excellent intellectual histo-
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We might say that a legal or political actor makes an argument refer-
encing segmentation in the following circumstances.  First, the per-
son proceeds from the assumption, or seeks to assert, that certain 
cleavages exist in American society that are persistent and significant 
within the polity.  We might expect the referenced cleavages to be 
tied to distinct and separate social identities.  Further, these argu-
ments may assert the permanence of these cleavages.  Or, they may 
assert a belief in the possibility of key cleavages eventually being 
erased—though the latter argument would likely be joined with an 
accompanying demand for a change of posture by the state and/or a 
hope that the passage of time would have significant effect in erasing 
differences.125  Second, implied within the preceding point, but worth 
spelling out explicitly, segmentation arguments invoke or perceive 
situations where the benefits or burdens tied to a particular issue or 
policy are relatively more targeted and specific to groups.  That is, 
these arguments emphasize at least a minimal overlapping of benefits 
or burdens across groups, and may contemplate direct conflicts of 
group interests.  To be sure, arguments reflecting segmentation may 
also accompany appeals to the public interest, though the more that 
broader, public interest themes recede, the more we may consider 
the argument an appeal to segmentation. 
Third, building upon the preceding point, segmentation argu-
ments need not be uniformly so.  The appeal to segmentation may, in 
a given instance, be relatively more or less pronounced; it may travel 
alone or it may be mixed with other kinds of arguments.  Fourth, and 
finally, themes of segmentation may be specific to certain issues or 
policy contexts, such that at a given moment in time, segmentation 
themes in one policy area may coexist with arguments and appeals to 
consensual pluralism or quasi-consensus in other policy areas.  That 
said, stronger forms of segmentation arguments would emphasize 
how certain societal cleavages encompass or implicate or simply over-
shadow multiple policy areas, with perhaps some pre-Civil War sec-
tional arguments serving as prominent, more dramatic examples of 
segmentation arguments.126 
 
ry of notions of pluralism tied to race and ethnicity, see JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO 
ME:  IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA 198–232 (rev. ed. 1984). 
125 See, for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s measured endorsement of race-based 
affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger, where she concluded her opinion for the Court 
by stating that  “[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”  539 U.S. at 343. 
126 See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT:  
A NORTON ANTHOLOGY 607, 617–18 (Isaac Kramnick & Theodore J. Lowi eds., 2009). 
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Beyond tentatively illuminating a distinctive mode of argument, 
these cases carry a second implication for American political thought:  
they point to the increasing acceptance of groups and group-based 
analyses within legal and political argument.  Consider first the cri-
tique that conservatives have sometimes made in accusing the Court’s 
liberal majority of referring back to Plessy v. Ferguson127 and other as-
criptive hierarchical precedents when the latter defends race-based 
affirmative action.128  While the critique is problematic,129 such argu-
ments are correct, of course, that pro-affirmative action arguments 
are invoking a form of group-based analysis rooted in social status. 
The fact that non-liberal (or even arguably illiberal), group-based 
concepts have such currency within the Court’s contemporary juris-
prudence on race, gender, and sexual orientation is not indicative of 
the contemporary Court departing from liberalism, or situating itself 
wholly outside the liberal tradition.  Rather, the tentative conclusion I 
draw from the gender and gay equality cases is that group-based con-
cepts constitute an interesting synthesis of liberal and non-liberal 
concepts.  This conceptual synthesis is constituted by a reaffirmation 
of the liberal commitment to equality across individuals.  But this 
commitment is applied to individuals and groups.  And this individu-
al-and group-focused commitment to equality is accompanied by at 
least the implicit judicial acceptance of quasi-permanent societal 
segmentation.  The fact that there has been political and social ac-
ceptance of such judicial actions accordingly indicates a broader ac-
 
127 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
128 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428–29 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
129 Where such arguments fall short is in assuming that references to social group status by 
liberal Court members in defense of affirmative action are legally and ethically equivalent 
to such references in defense of racial subordination and ascriptive hierarchy.  To the 
contrary, we see the contemporary Court deploying group identity toward ends that can 
plausibly be defended as egalitarian rather than oppressive to racial minorities.  On this 
point, Justice John Paul Stevens stated that 
[t]he Court’s concept of ‘consistency’ assumes that there is no significant differ-
ence between a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the mem-
bers of a minority race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to cer-
tain members of that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on some 
members of the majority.  In my opinion that assumption is untenable.  There is 
no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to per-
petuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.  Invid-
ious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to 
enhance or maintain the power of the majority.  Remedial race-based preferences 
reflect the opposite impulse:  a desire to foster equality in society.  No sensible 
conception of the Government’s constitutional obligation to ‘govern impartially,’ 
should ignore this distinction. 
  Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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ceptance within the polity of these conceptual innovations related to 
liberal ideology. 
To conclude on two speculative points, we might first ask whether 
this mixture of non-liberal and liberal concepts, as reflected in the 
Court’s contemporary doctrine on gender and gay equality, is a posi-
tive thing from the standpoint of liberal goals.  On the one hand, 
more obviously, the answer to this query might be a very emphatic 
endorsement.  The cases here, after all, show liberal goals being ad-
vanced by illiberal concepts.  Judicial recognition of ascriptive differ-
ences—and making these differences the basis for legal and political 
reform beneficial to disfavored groups—are ultimately furthering 
emancipation and the freedom of individuals across social barriers 
that may have remained legally invisible in the absence of social 
group recognition.  Indeed, once a given social characteristic is 
viewed by the judiciary as a significant and substantive departure 
from a liberal baseline of universal equality, liberalism’s demand for 
universalism can obviously be a powerful tool for change and reform. 
Yet, on the other hand, there is also a sense in which harnessing 
group difference to liberalism’s demand for universal equality may 
carry costs as well.  Liberalism’s emancipatory power is most promi-
nent and attractive when confronted with a disfavored group seeking 
to enjoy the same set of rights and entitlements enjoyed by all non-
subordinated groups—for example, admission to a public school, or 
the right to marry.  Liberalism’s demand for universal equality might 
even plausibly encompass situations like affirmative action, where dif-
ferential treatment is used toward achieving goals recognized as 
broadly desirable and important such as admission to elite universi-
ties or programs, or obtaining competitive employment positions.  
But if we take the notion of group difference seriously, it must also 
imply that different groups may ultimately value different kinds of 
goals or purposes at different moments in time.  In situations where 
emancipation, freedom, and anti-subordination may demand recog-
nition of a varied and different set of aims for different groups, liber-
alism’s commitment to universal equality may limit the legal recogni-
tion of important group differences.130  For example, although race-
based affirmative action can plausibly be defended in liberal terms, 
the continuing concern felt by some concerning the differential 
treatment afforded to distinct racial groups directly speaks to the ten-
 
130 On the costs that liberal principles may impose upon disadvantaged social groups, see 
YOUNG, supra note 119, at 112–16, 164–65. 
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sion that exists between these programs and the liberal commitment 
to equality. 
Still, regardless of how we might normatively evaluate this concep-
tual synthesis, it seems hard to imagine social group differences dis-
appearing anytime soon, no matter how enthusiastic one might re-
main about assimilation as a goal in American society.131  This leads to 
my second speculative point:  to the extent that liberalism will remain 
the dominant political philosophy in America, it will continue to 
maintain, and will likely expand upon, its conceptual accommodation 
of social groups.  One point of likely conceptual accommodation is 
already well-illustrated in the gender and gay equality cases discussed 
above.  Liberal defenses of the judicial reforms in these cases can 
claim that these rulings are first and foremost about removing legal 
disabilities arbitrarily imposed on individuals.  To the extent that so-
cial groups continue to be viewed as reliable proxies for individual 
rights, we may see an expansion of judicial and political rhetorical 
emphasis on social groups as key, constitutive units of American soci-
ety.132 
Another possible point of conceptual accommodation between 
liberalism and social group-difference can also be gleaned in the as-
sumptions of equality within the gender and gay rights cases.  A more 
robust recognition of group-difference may ultimately lie in fleshing 
out the liberal notion of equality and emphasizing the multi-faceted 
demands of equality.  Once equality and emancipation are under-
stood in more context-specific, structural, and historically based ways, 
it may ultimately lead the judiciary and the polity to greater recogni-
tion and acceptance of differential treatment of social groups as an 
implication of liberal equality. 
A form of liberalism more accommodating of social group differ-
ences may be another episode in liberalism’s evolution and a sign of 
its near-endless flexibility.  Conversely, a liberalism that is more ac-
commodating of social groups could signal the loosening of liberal-
 
131 See id. at 47, 163–64. 
132 Will Kymlicka has notably emphasized how a state’s provision of group-specific rights may 
be justified within liberal theory.  As he states, “For meaningful individual choice to be 
possible, individuals need not only access to information, the capacity to reflectively eval-
uate it, and freedom of expression and association.  They also need access to a societal 
culture.  Group-differentiated measures that secure and promote this access may, there-
fore, have a legitimate role to play in a liberal theory of justice.”  WILL KYMLICKA, 
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP:  A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 84 (1995); see also 
id. at 52, 82–93 (describing the impact of national and cultural identity on self-
identification); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR:  NATIONALISM, 
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 39–42 (2001) (discussing liberal culturalism). 
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ism’s grip upon American politics and American political thought.  
However we might classify such a development in political theoretical 
terms, however, it would be in keeping with trends in the Court’s ju-
risprudence since the mid-twentieth century, and it would certainly 
speak to normative principles worthy of broader judicial and political 
acceptance. 
CONCLUSION 
In situating key constitutional developments within core themes 
drawn from American political thought, I have illuminated some 
fundamental judicial presumptions about American society and how 
it is constituted that underlay the various opinions.  In doing so and 
in emphasizing how the judicial rhetoric on groups differs between 
the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours legislation and the post-
Brown cases on gender and gay equality, I have sought to illuminate 
the ideal of societal segmentation in judicial arguments.  Segmenta-
tion arguments are significant, I have argued, as a crucial component 
of some of the Court’s more recent, significant rulings on social 
groups and equality.  Segmentation arguments are also worthy of at-
tention as a historically important and recurrent mode of argument 
in American political and legal thought.  As discussed in the preced-
ing Part, it remains ambiguous as to what segmentation ideals ulti-
mately imply for American liberalism more broadly.  Since both will 
remain firmly entrenched within American political and legal 
thought for the foreseeable future, the points of conceptual conver-
gence, mutual accommodation, and conceptual divergence between 
liberalism and segmentation will undoubtedly continue to shift and 
evolve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

